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THE MEANING OF EQUALITY IN LAW, 
SCIENCE, MATH, AND MORALS: A 
REPLYt 
Peter Westen": 
My argument about equality can be simply stated. Equality, I 
argue, has two qualities that together disqualify it as an explanatory 
norm in law and morals. It is both empty and confusing: "empty" 
in that it derives its entire meaning from normative standards that 
logically precede it; "confusing" in that it obscures the content of the 
normative standards that logically precede it. 
Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Anthony D' Amato challenge 
these assertions. They both deny that equality is empty, by arguing 
that equality is an independent value with normative content of its 
own. Professor Chemerinsky further denies that equality is confus-
ing, by arguing that equality is rhetorically superior to alternative 
normative concepts. 
I am grateful to Professors Chemerinsky and D' Amato for taking 
my argument seriously, and for taking the time and thought to re-
spond. I am afraid, however, that their arguments fail to persuade 
me. Indeed, if anything, their arguments further demonstrate how 
empty and truly confusing equality is. 
Their arguments, nevertheless, have clarified my thinking in one 
respect. They have caused me to see more clearly than I did before 
that my principal assertions about equality- that equality is empty, 
and that equality is confusing - are true in quite different ways. 
That equality is empty is an analytical truth. It is true in the same 
way (and for the same reason) that it is true that 2 plus 2 equals 4. It 
is a subject on which reasonable people cannot differ. That equality 
is confusing, on the other hand, is a truth of a different kind. It can-
not be proved in the same way that 2 plus 2 can be proved to equal 4. 
It is something about which people may reasonably differ. Yet it is 
true, I believe, in the same way that most assertions in law and 
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morals are true - because the arguments in its favor are more per-
suasive, more reasonable, than the arguments against it. 1 
I shall set forth my thesis in Part I, using the Declaration of Inde-
pendence ("all men are created equal") to illustrate that the empti-
ness of equality inheres in its very meaning, and that the confusions 
of equality result from neglecting its meaning. In Part II, I respond 
to Professors Chemerinsky's and D' Amato's reasons for believing 
that equality has independent normative content of its own. In Part 
III, I respond to Professor Chemerinsky's separate reasons for be-
lieving that equality is rhetorically useful. 
I. THE MEANING OF EQUALITY 
The emptiness and confusions of equality can be illustrated in 
countless ways. Consider the Declaration of Independence. "We 
hold these truths to be self evident," it declares, "that all men are 
created equal." Few issues in American history have been subjected 
to more debate than the truth and meaning of the latter declaration. 2 
The most famous and, perhaps, most momentous debate on the sub-
ject took place between Senator Stephen Douglas and candidate 
Abraham Lincoln in the Illinois senatorial campaign of 1858. The 
Lincoln-Douglas debates focused in large part on whether blacks 
and whites are equal within the meaning of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. Stephen Douglas argued that blacks and whites are not 
equal in law or fact, and are not declared to be equal in the 
Declaration: 
I hold that a negro is not and never ought to be a citizen of the United 
States. I hold that this Government was made on the white basis by 
white men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and 
should be administered by white men and none others. . . . I am 
aware that all the Abolition lecturers that you find traveling about 
through the country, are in the habit of reading the Declaration of In-
dependence to prove that all men were created equal . . . . Mr. Lin-
coln is very much in the habit of . . . reading that part of the 
Declaration of Independence to prove that the negro was endowed by 
the Almighty with the inalienable right of equality with white men. 
1. For the difference between truth in mathematics and truth in law - between logical 
truths, on the one hand, and rhetorical or dialectical or polemical truths, on the other hand -
see C. PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: EsSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL REASON-
ING 120-74 {1980); C. PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES 1-61, 117-33 
(1979). CJ. Burke, Politics as Rhetoric, 93 ETHICS 45, 46-47 (1982) (contrasting "authorita-
rian" political systems in which there is only one morally correct answer and in which the 
answer can be known with certainty with a "rhetorical" system grounded on the principles of 
"persuasion"). 
2. For a recent contribution to the debate, see G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA 210-28 
(1978). 
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Now, I say to you, my fellow-citizens, that in my opinion, the signers of 
· the Declaration had no reference to the negro whatever, when they 
declared all men to be created equal. They desired to express by that 
phrase white men, men of European birth and European descent, and 
had no reference either to the negro, the savage Indians, the Fejee, the 
Malay, or any other inferior and degraded race, when they spoke of the 
equality of men.3 
Abraham Lincoln argued that while blacks and whites are unequal 
to one another in "color," they are equal to one another in their es-
sential rights and are declared to be so 'in the Declaration of 
Independence: 
I adhere to the Declaration of Independence. If Judge Douglas and his 
friends are not willing to stand by it, let them come up and amend it. 
Let them make it read that all men are created equal except negroes. 
Let us have it decided, whether the Declaration of Independence, in 
this blessed year of 1858, shall thus be amended. 
My declarations upon this subject of negro slavery may be misrep-
resented, but cannot be misunderstood. I have said that I do not un-
derstand the Declaration to mean that all men were created equal in all 
respects. They are not our equal in color; but I suppose it does mean to 
~~~all~~~in~~~~~~in~ 
right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness".4 
The two speakers, Lincoln and Douglas, thought they disagreed 
about whether blacks and whites are created equal. They were mis-
taken. They did not clearly understand what equality means; and 
not understanding it, they allowed equality to create disagreements 
that did not exist and to mask disagreements that did exist. They 
thought they disagreed about whether blacks and whites are equal, 
but in fact they disagreed about the standard by which to measure 
the equality or inequality of blacks and whites in one particular re-
spect - their capacity for enslavement. 
To understand the Lincoln-Douglas confusion about equality, 
one must understand what equality means. What is the core mean-
ing of equality? What is the common logic that links equality in 
mathematics with equality in law and morals? What does the state-
ment "2 plus 2 equals 4" have in common with the principle "[n]o 
3. Speech of Stephen A. Douglas at Jonesboro, Sept. 15, 1858, in POLITICAL DEBATES BE-
TWEEN HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 116 (1860) [hereinafter 
cited as THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES]. 
4. Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Springfield, July 17, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS 
DEBATES, supra note 3, at 63. "It is doubtful,'' it has been said, "that any forensic duel •• , 
ever held the power of decision over the future of a great people as these debates did," H. 
JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED 19 (1959). 
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State shall . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws"? 
A. The Definition of Equality 
Equality, at first glance, appears to mean something different in 
math and science than in law and morals. We use it in math and 
science to state things as they are; we use it in law and morals to state 
things as they should be. The former is a set of descriptive state-
ments, the latter a set of prescriptive statements. In reality, however, 
there is no difference at all between the two sets of statements - no 
difference, that is, as far as equality is concerned. The concept of 
equality is one and the same in all its usages. To demonstrate this, 
we begin with the meaning of equality in descriptive statements and 
then move to its meaning in prescriptive statements. 
1. Descriptive Equality 
What do we mean when we say that two atomic particles are 
"equal" or "unequal," or that the speeds of two objects are equal or 
unequal to one another, or that 2 + 2 is equal to 4 and unequal to 3? 
What are the constituent elements of "equality" and "inequality" in 
such descriptive statements? 
To begin with, descriptive statements of equality and inequality 
cannot be made about solitary things. No single thing, standing 
alone, can be either equal or unequal. To say a thing is equal or 
unequal is to say it is equal or unequal to something - that is1 to 
something else. Statements of descriptive equality and inequality 
thus presuppose plurality.5 
Plurality alone, however, does not suffice to explain equality and 
inequality. Conjunctive and disjunctive terms also presuppose a plu-
rality of objects, but the objects do not necessarily stand to one an-
other in relationships of equality or inequality. The conjunctive 
term "and" presupposes two objects, but the objects so joined have 
no necessary relationship to one another beyond their conjunction. 
In contrast, to say that two objects are equal or unequal does more 
than conjoin them. It compares them. It describes the two objects by 
reference to one another. Thus, statements of equality and inequal-
ity - like statements that one thing is larger than another, or 
5. "In the case of identity there is only one object corresponding to the name whereas in 
the case of equality we are dealing with two objects." Menne, Identity, Equality, Similarity: A 
Logico-Philosophical Investigation, 4 RATIO 50, 57 (1962); id. at 51 (Statements of equality and 
inequality "presuppos[e] two objects."). 
608 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:604 
smaller, or similar, or dissimilar - are "comparative" in nature.6 
All comparative statements, including statements of equality and 
inequality, presuppose external standards of measurement. One can-
not declare one woman to be more beautiful than another without 
first possessing a standard of what counts as "beautiful."7 The same 
is also true of equality and inequality. One cannot declare two things 
to be equal or unequal without first comparing them, and one cannot 
compare them without first possessing a standard by which they can 
be jointly measured. A rainbow and a Wordsworth ode, it is said, 
are "neither equal nor unequal," because "we have no [common] 
measure or standard for comparing them."8 
Equality and inequality differ, however, from other comparative 
concepts. Their distinctive meanings are implicit in the ordinary 
way we talk.9 Consider the way we talk about money. A ten-dollar 
6. See J. FEINBERG, Noncomparative Justice, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF 
LIBERTY 265, 265-68, 278 (1980). 
7. Thomas Jefferson, for example, believed that Caucasians are more beautiful than Ne-
groes, but his belief was necessarily based on the positing of particular standards of physical 
beauty: 
The first difference (between whites and blacks] which strikes us is that of colour .••• 
And is this difference of no importance? Is it not the foundation of a greater or less share 
of beauty in the two races? Are not the fine mixtures of red and white, the expressions of 
every passion by greater or less suffusions of colour in the one, preferable to that eternal 
monotony, which reigns in the countenances, that immoveable veil of black which covers 
all the emotions of the other race? Add to these, flowing hair, a more elegant symmetry of 
form, their own judgment in favour of whites, declared by their preference of them . • . . 
T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 138 (W. Peden ed. 1972). 
8. E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 38-39 (1980) (emphasis in origi-
nal). See also id. at 38: 
You wouldn't be understood if you said that a rose and a hyacinth were unequal, not 
unless it was understood what standard of comparison you had in mind. There might be 
such measure - depth of color, for instance, or size, or even fragrance. But the judgment 
of inequality and a measure go together, the former requires the latter . 
. . . [A] judgment of inequality presumes that there is some measure, otherwise the 
judgment would not make sense. 
. . . As a dog and a cat are not unequal, they are not equal either. And a rose and a 
hyacinth are neither equal nor unequal. Neither "equality" nor "inequality" need apply, 
because in these instances a measure is lacking. 
9. See Bedau, Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality, in NoMos IX: EQUALITY 3, 5-7 (J, 
Chapman & J. Pennock eds. 1967); Menne, supra note 5 at 51. 
I do not mean to suggest that words derive their meaning entirely from antecedent defini-
tions, or that people learn to communicate through words by first mastering dictionary mean-
ings. The process is often precisely the opposite: Words derive their meanings, their 
definitions, from the way they are used. As a consequence, words in ordinary language can 
rarely be cabined within determinate definitions. Consider the term "identical," for example. 
We speak of "identical twins," yet we obviously do not mean that the twins are identical in 
every descriptive respect. We mean, rather, that though the twins are not entirely identical-
though they are not the same person - they are identical in controlling respects, i.e., geneti-
cally. We mean, in other words, that the twins are genetically "equal." Yet we can use "identi-
cal" in connection with "twins" without thereby confusing people into thinking that we are 
referring to two persons who are identical in every respect (in the way, for example, that the 
President of the United States and Ronald Reagan are identical in every respect), because the 
word "twin" presupposes two persons who are logically and inevitably different in some re-
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bill and a twenty-dollar bill are "similar," but they are not "equal" 
to one another; David's one-dollar bill and Mary's one-dollar bill are 
"equal," but they are not the "same" one-dollar bill. The distinctive 
meanings of equality and inequality also appear in mathematics. 
The sum of 2 + 2 is "equal" to 4, not "similar" to 4; the sum of 2 + 2 
is "unequal" to 3, not "dissimilar" to 3. The numbers 31 and 13 are 
"similar" to one another, but they are not "equal" to one another. 
The symbols 2 + 2 and the symbol 4 are "equal" to one another, but 
they are not the "same" symbol. 
What, then, distinguishes equality from "similarity," and ine-
quality from "dissimilarity"? The answer, it seems, is that equality 
and inequality seem to connote a greater sameness and a greater dif-
ference, respectively, than do "similarity" and "dissimilarity." A 
ten-dollar bill and a twenty-dollar bill are similar, but they are not 
also equal, because they are not sufficiently the same as one another 
to qualify as equal. They are the same in some important respects, 
but not in others: the same in shape and size and weight and color, 
but not in the important respect of monetary value. By the same 
token, an arabic numeral three ("3") and a roman numeral three 
("III") are quite dissimilar in their particular configurations, but they 
are not also unequal, because they are not sufficiently different from 
one another to qualify as "unequal." A roman numeral three is dif-
ferent in some important respects, but not in others: different in the 
angularity of its shape, the straightness of its lines, and the discon-
nectedness of its parts, but not in the important respect of numerical 
value. 
To some observers this suggests that saying things are equal or 
unequal means that they are the same or different, respectively, in 
spects. The same is also true of the terms "same" and "similar" as they appear in the axioms, 
"people who are the same should be treated the same," and "people who are similarly situated 
should be treated similarly." To say two people are the "same" in the context of the axiom 
does not mean that they are identical in every respect; it means, rather, that they are the same 
in the controlling respect - the very same thing that we ordinarily mean by "equal." By the 
same token, to say people are "similarly situated" does not mean that they are identically 
situated in less than all controlling respects; it means, rather, that they are identically situated 
in all controlling respects - again, the very thing that we ordinarily mean by "equal." Yet we 
use the terms "same" and "similar'' in the two axioms interchangeably with the term "equal" 
(as in "equals should be treated equally"), because in the context of the axioms, there is little 
danger of confusing people regarding the senses in which we are using the terms. 
Nevertheless, though the three terms can be used interchangeably without confusion in 
some contexts, they cannot be used interchangeably without confusion in all contexts, because 
they have discrete meanings that would be lost or confused in the latter contexts. Thus, there 
is a decided difference between saying David and Mary have an "equal" vote, and saying they 
have the "same" vote" - a difference that inheres in the discrete meanings and uses of 
"equal" and "same." We know the difference in meaning, because we know how to use and 
not to use the two terms in contexts in which interchanging them would cause confusion. 
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every possible respect. 10 But that cannot be so. For just as "similar" 
differs from "equal" in its lack of sufficient identity, so, too, "equal" 
differs from "same" in its lack of complete identity; and just as "dis-
similar" differs from "unequal" in its lack of sufficient nonidentity, 
"unequal" differs from "different" in its lack of complete noniden-
tity. Thus, David's one-dollar bill and Mary's one-dollar bill are 
equal, but they are not the same one-dollar bill, because David's 
one-dollar bill is not identical to Mary's in every possible respect. 
No two things in the world can ever be identical in every respect, 
because things that are identical in every possible respect are no 
longer two tilings, but one and the same thing. I I David's one-dollar 
bill cannot be the same as Mary's in every respect because it contains 
different molecules and occupies different space. Conversely, nickels 
and dimes are unequal in value, but they are not different from one 
another in every possible respect, because they possess essential fea-
tures in common. No two things in the world are completely differ-
ent in every respect because they would then no longer be things of 
the world. All material things are identical in containing matter and 
occupying space; all tangible and intangible things that can be con-
ceived by the mind are identical in being conceivable by the mind. 
With regard to the sufficiency of their identity and nonidentity, 
therefore, equal falls somewhere between "similar," on the one 
hand, and "same," on the other hand; and unequal falls somewhere 
between "dissimilar," on the one hand, and "different," on the other 
hand. To say two things are equal means that they are identical in 
more important respects than things that are merely similar. I2 Yet to 
say two things are equal also means that they are less completely 
identical than things that are one and the same thing. I3 (The same 
10. Plato seems to have taken this position in arguing that no two material things can ever 
be "absolute[ly]'' equal because there will always be some sense in which they are unequal. 
See PLATO, Phaedo 74b-c, in I THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 401-02 (B. Jowett trans. 1874). Cf. 
E. WOLGAST, supra note 8, at 40 (suggesting that to say two persons are "equal" means they 
are interchangeable in all respects). 
11. Leibnitz demonstrated the truth of this statement in what has come to be known as his 
Principle of the Identity of Indiscemibles. See w. RABINOWICZ, UN!VERSALIZABILITY 24-25, 
113-14 (1979). 
12. Thus two dresses are called "similar'' when they have the same colour and shape but 
are made up of different kinds of material and they ma>' also differ in the buttons and 
added embellishments. Two cars may be called "similar' if they have the same body but 
different colours and engines of different power. This kind of similarity is called by 
Ziehen "frustal similarity" (from the Latin "frustum" which means piece or fragment), 
Menne, supra note 5, at 60. 
13. We are confronted here with two names, but in the case of identity there is only one 
object corresponding to the name whereas in the case of equality we are dealing with two 
objects. Menne, supra note 5, at 57. 
Dare we generalize from the facts so far by saying that "equal" means "same," as though 
the two words were synonymous? Clearly not; the requisite condition of substitutivity for 
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relationships obtain between "dissimilar'' and "unequal," and "une-
qual" and "different").14 What, then, is this in-between relationship 
of "equality" that we invoke so easily in ordinary discourse? 
The answer may be clear by now. To say two things are descrip-
tively equal does not mean they are identical in some significant re-
spects (like things that are similar); and it does not mean they are 
identical in all respects (like something that is one and the same 
thing). It means that they are identical in all significant descriptive 
respects. By the same token, to say two or more things are descrip-
tively unequal means they are not identical in all significant descrip-
tive respects. To reduce the two concepts to their constituent parts, 
to speak of descriptive "equals" is to say that (i) two or more things, 
(ii) have been compared to one another by reference to a particular 
descriptive standard of measurement, (iii) and have been found to be 
identical by reference to that particular standard. To speak of de-
scriptive "unequals" is to say that (i) two or more things, (ii) have 
been compared to one another by reference to a particular descrip-
tive standard of measurement, (iii) and have been found to be non-
identical by that particular standard. 
To illustrate, consider the previous examples. When we say that 
a ten-dollar bill and a twenty-dollar bill are descriptively similar, we 
mean that by given descriptive standards of color, shape, size, weight 
and value, the ten-dollar bill is identical to the twenty-dollar bill in 
some respects, but not in others. When we say David's one-dollar bill 
and Mary's one-dollar bill are equal, we do not mean the two bills 
are identical in every possible descriptive respect, because no two 
things are identical in every possible respect. We mean, rather, that 
they are identical in all the descriptive respects we deem relevant, 
synonym-pairs fails for this pair. If I gave Mark and Paul equal servings, I did not give 
them the same serving; what I did was to serve them the same amount, servings of the 
same size. If I gave you the same answer I gave him, I didn't give you an answer equal to 
the one I gave him; I gave you the very answer I gave him. 
Bedau, supra note 9, at 7 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 8 ("Equality, thus, not only 
does not imply identity, it implies non-identity.") (footnote omitted); id. at 12 ("We have also 
seen that things equal to each other are never the same as each other, ie., the very same 
thing."); notes 10-11 supra. 
14. Things that are "unequal" are nonidentical in more important ways than things that 
are merely dissimilar, and they are nonidentical in less complete ways than things that are 
truly different. 
To be sure, no two things can ever be nonidentical in every possible respect, any more than 
any two things can ever be identical in every possible respect. It follows, therefore, that when 
someone says that two things are "different," he cannot mean that they are nonidentical in 
every respect - any more than he can mean by saying two things are the "same" that they are 
identical in every respect. Rather, in saying two things are different, he means that they are 
nonidentical in all apparent respects, just as in saying two things are the "same" he means that 
they are identical in all apparent respects. 
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whether the relevant respect be value alone, or a combination of 
value, shape, size, weight, and color. 15 By the same token, when we 
say that 13 and 31 are unequal, we do not mean that they are non-
identical in every possible descriptive respect. We mean, rather, that 
they are nonidentical in the particular descriptive respect that is 
deemed relevant by the conventions of mathematics - that is, in 
respect to their numerical value. 
These meanings of descriptive equality and inequality entail sev-
eral important consequences. First, since all material things in the 
world are descriptively identical to one another in one or more re-
spects, it follows that they are all descriptively "equal" to one an-
other in one or more respects. Since all material things are also 
descriptively nonidentical in one or more respects, it also follows 
that all things are also descriptively "unequal" in one or more re-
spects. The combination of the two means that things that are de-
scriptively equal in a certain respect are, necessarily, descriptively 
unequal in some other respect. 16 
Furthermore, it follows from the meanings of descriptive equality 
and inequality that, descriptively, the notion of "absolute"17 equality 
is either redundant or contradictory - depending upon what is 
meant by "absolute." If by absolute equality one means that two or 
more things are completely and perfectly identical in the relevant 
descriptive respect, the term "absolute" is redundant, because every 
15. Bedau, supra note 9, at 7. 
16. Bedau, supra note 9, at 8; Menne, supra note 5, at 53-54 ("[I]f two individuals x and y 
have the identical property F but are themselves not identical, then they must differ at least in 
a property G."). 
17. And shall we ... affirm that there is a such a thing as equality, not of wood with 
wood, or of stone with stone, but that, over and above this, there is equality in the ab-
stract? Shall we affirm this? 
Affirm, yes, and swear to it, replied Simmias, with all the confidence in life. 
And whence did we obtain this knowledge? Did we not see equalities of material 
things, such as pieces of wood and stone, and gather from them the idea of an equality 
which is different from them? - you will admit that? Or look at the matter again m this 
way: Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another 
time unequal? 
That is certain. 
But are real equals ever unequal? Or is the idea of equality ever inequality? 
That surely was never yet known, Socrates. 
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material 
equals? And what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same 
sense as absolute equality? Or do they fall short of this in a measure? 
Yes, he said, in a very great measure too. 
Then we must have known absolute equality previously to the time when we first saw 
the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals aim at this absolute equal-
ity, but fall short of it? 
PLATO, supra note 10, 74-75, at 401-02. 
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relationship of descriptive equality is absolute in that sense. To say 
two or more things are descriptively equal in a certain respect means 
that they are completely and perfectly identical by reference to that 
particular descriptive standard.18 To say David's and Mary's one-
dollar bills are descriptively equal in value means that in respect of 
their monetary value they are completely and perfectly identical. On 
the other hand, if by absolute equality one means that two or more 
things are descriptively identical in every possible descriptive respect, 
the term "absolute" is contradictory, because no two things are de-
scriptively equal in that sense .. To talk of descriptive equality is to 
talk of a relationship of comparison between two or more things; and 
to talk of two or more things is to talk of things that can never be 
identical in every possible descriptive respect. 
Finally, it follows from the meanings of descriptive equality and 
inequality that statements of descriptive equality and inequality are 
inherently derivative. One cannot know whether two or more things 
are descriptively equal or unequal without first going through the 
steps of (i) identifying a descriptive standard for measuring them, (ii) 
invoking the descriptive standard to measure each of them, and (iii) 
comparing the results. Yet once one has performed the foregoing 
steps, one has nothing more to learn about the two things in terms of 
their equality or inequality. If the two things are discovered to be 
identical by the chosen standard, it follows that they are "equal." If 
they are discovered to be nonidentical by that standard, it follows 
that they are "unequal." Their equality or inequality is nothing but 
a derivative and conclusory statement of what it means to have com-
pared them to one another by reference to a given descriptive 
standard. 19 
To illustrate the three foregoing conclusions, consider the rela-
18. See Bedau, supra note 13, at 7 ("Things that are equal in a certain respect will nor-
mally be quite dissimilar to each other in other respects; but whereas in the respect in which 
they are equal they are not merely similar but the same.") (emphasis added); McCloskey, Egal-
itarianism, Equality, and Justice, 44 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 50, 54-55 (1966) (emphasis added): 
It is true that we can say that two men have equal yet different abilities - e.g., that one 
has a creative mind, the other a keen, critical intellect, or that two women are equally 
beautiful although having different styles of beauty, the one a cold, remote, formal beauty, 
the other a warm, vibrant, vital beauty. But in each case we should, if pressed, seek to 
justify our claim about the equality of ability, or of beauty, in terms of some ultimate 
identity of some sort. Otherwise, if we could not point to some such identity, we should 
withdraw the word "equally" and say that both are very able or very beautiful but in 
different ways. 
19. See Brown, Nonegalitarian Justice, 56 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 48, 52 (1970) (all moral 
statements of equality are "derivative" and "consequential" in nature); Flathman, Equality and 
Generalization, a Formal Analysis, in NoMos IX: EQUALITY 38, 51 (J. Chapman & J. Pennock, 
eds. 1967) (emphasis in original) ("Equality is a significant normative criterion only in a deriva-
tive sense"). 
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tionship between two sticks of wood, one of which is 5 inches long, 
the other of which is 5¼ inches long. Like all things in the world, the 
two sticks are descriptively equal in some respects, and descriptively 
unequal in other respects: equal in respect of whether or not they 
contain water molecules, unequal in respect of how many water mol-
ecules they contain. As with all things in the world, one cannot 
know whether they are descriptively equal or unequal without first 
positing a descriptive standard of measurement. Measured by the 
standard of whole inches, they are perfectly equal: they are "abso-
lutely" identical in both being at least 5 inches long and yet less than 
6 inches long. Measured by the standard of quarter inches, they are 
unequal: they are "absolutely" unequal in that one is 5 inches long 
and the other is 5¼ inches long. To say they are descriptively equal 
or unequal merely restates, derivatively, their identity or nonidentity 
by reference to a given descriptive statement. 
2. Prescriptive Equality 
The meanings of descriptive equality and inequality should now 
be clear. What, then, is the relationship between descriptive equality 
and prescriptive equality? How does one move from a descriptive 
determination that two or more persons or things are equal (or un-
equal) to a prescriptive conclusion that they ought to be treated as 
equal ( or unequal)? 
The answer, of course, is that purely descriptive premises do not 
themselves generate prescriptive conclusions. One cannot derive an 
"ought" from an "is," and one cannot infer that people are prescrip-
tively equal or unequal from a finding that they are descriptively 
equal or unequal.20 Indeed, based on the previous discussion of de-
scriptive equality and inequality, it is contradictory to suppose other-
wise. All people are descriptively equal in some respects and 
descriptively unequal in other respects. If one could inf er normative 
equality and inequality from empirical equality and inequality, one 
would have to conclude that all people are, at one and the same time, 
both morally equal and morally unequal to one another. 
Prescriptive statements of equality and inequality nevertherless 
share an important feature in common with descriptive statements of 
equality and inequality. They both speak in the language of "equal-
ity" and "inequality" and, hence, both share in the common proper-
ties of that language. To say persons are morally or legally "equal" 
- like all statements of equality - presupposes the existence of at 
20. See D. Hawkins, The Science and Ethics of Equality 11-12 (1977). 
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least two persons. It also presupposes a comparison of the two per-
sons to one another and, hence, a standard of comparison. To say 
two people are morally or legally equal means that they are morally 
or legally identical to one another by some particular standard of 
comparison, just as saying they are legally or morally unequal means 
they are morally or legally nonidentical by some such standard. 
The real difference between descriptive equality and prescriptive 
equality is not in the nature of the comparisons they connote, but in 
the standards by which the comparisons are made. ·oescriptive 
equality is premised on descriptive standards; prescriptive equality is 
premised on prescriptive standards. To say two things are descrip-
tively equal means they are identical by reference to a given empiri-
cal standard that measures (or "describes") the way things are. To 
say two people are prescriptively equal means they are identical by 
reference to a given normative standard that measures ( or 
"prescribes") the way people should be treated. The identities and 
nonidentities that prescriptive standards entail are a product of their 
structure. Prescriptive standards are statements or sentences of the 
form: "Persons who possess characteristics Ci, C2, C3, ••• C10, shall 
render to persons possessing traits Ti, T 2, T 3, • • • T 10, treatment 
with features Fi, F2, F3, • • • F 10, or suffer penalties with elements 
Ei, Bi, E3, • • • E10, for failing to do so." As such, prescriptive stan-
dards cont.ain two essential elements: First, they contain descriptive 
standards for identifying persons with characteristics Ci, C2, C3, • • • 
C10, persons with traits Ti, T 2, T 3, • • • T 10, and treatments with fea-
tures Fi, F2, F3, ••• F 10• Second, they link or "connect" the forego-
ing descriptions, declaring persons with the relevant characteristics 
to be obliged to render to persons with the relevant traits whatever 
treatments possess the relevant features. The combination is a nor-
mative "rule" or "right" by which certain persons owe a certain kind 
of treatment to certain other persons. Insofar as the rule defines per-
sons to be identical in the treatment they owe or are owed, the rule 
renders them prescriptively equal; insofar as the rule defines people 
to be nonidentical in the treatment they owe or are owed, the rule 
renders them prescriptively unequal. 
Assume, for example, that a state requires ordinary motorists to 
yield the right of way to motorists on the right. The prescription may 
be stated in the following form: "Any motorist, except ambulance, 
police or fire department drivers with sirens sounding, who ap-
proaches an unmarked intersection shall yield the right of way to 
motorists approaching from the right." Like all prescriptive stan-
dards, the rule classifies persons in accord with the treatments they 
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owe and are owed and, hence, defines the extent to which such per-
sons are identical or nonidentical, equal or unequal. The rule de-
fines all drivers to be identical and, hence, equal in that it formally 
subjects all motorists to the rule: "Any motorist, except ambulance, 
police or fire department drivers with sirens sounding, who ap-
proaches an unmarked intersection shall yield the right of way to 
motorists approaching from the right." The rule also provides inter-
nal equalities and inequalities: internal equalities among all ambu-
lance, police and fire department drivers approaching unmarked 
intersections from the left with sirens sounding, among all other mo-
torists approaching intersections from the left, among all motorists 
approaching intersections from the right, and so forth; internal 
inequalities between the class of ambulance drivers with sirens 
sounding and the class of ambulance drivers without sirens sounding, 
between the class of ordinary motorists approaching unmarked in-
tersections from the left and the class of motorists approaching un-
marked intersections from the right, between the class of motorists 
approaching unmarked intersections and the class of motorists ap-
proaching marked intersections, between the class of motorists and 
nonmotorists, and so forth. 
Again, as with descriptive equality, the meaning of prescriptive 
equality entails several important consequences. First, since pre-
scriptive standards necessarily incorporate descriptive standards for 
identifying persons (I.e., persons with traits Ti, T2, T3, ••• T 10, who 
possess claims against persons with characteristics C 1, C2, C3, ••• 
C10, for treatment with features Fi, F2, F3, ••• F 10), and since no 
two persons are identical - or equal - by every possible descriptive 
standard, it follows that no two persons are identical or equal by 
every possible prescriptive standard. Similarly, since prescriptive 
standards necessarily incorporate descriptive standards for identify-
ing persons, and since all people are always identical by some possi-
ble descriptive standard, it follows that all people are always alike by 
some possible prescriptive standard. The two conclusions, com-
bined, mean that persons who are prescriptively equal in one respect 
are necessarily prescriptively unequal in other respects, and vice 
versa.21 
Furthermore, since prescriptive standards necessarily classify all 
21. Thus, people who are prescriptively equal by the prescriptive rule "to each according 
to his need" may be prescriptively unequal by the prescriptive rule "to each according to his 
merit." See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1164 
(1969) ("Simply to say that it is right to treat people equally rather than unequally is meaning-
less ... , since to treat two people equally in one respect will always be to treat them unequally 
in others."). 
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people on the basis of the treatments they owe and are owed, it fol-
lows that prescriptive standards do not treat people as either equals 
or unequals, but as equals and unequals. Consider the prescriptive 
standard or rule "to each according to his needs." The rule defines 
all persons as prescriptively equal, by declaring all persons to be 
identical in being subject to the rule "to each according to his 
needs." The rule further defines all persons as internally equal, by 
declaring all persons to be identical in being entitled to distributions · 
according to need. Yet the rule also defines people as internally un-
equal, by distinguishing among people on the basis of their individ-
ual needs. The rule treats the very same people as equals in some 
respects and as unequals in other respects, depending upon the way 
one characterizes the standards of the rule. 
Finally, since prescriptive equality is the relationship of identity 
that obtains among persons as a consequence of a given prescriptive 
rule, it follows that prescriptive equality is derivative in the same 
sense and for the same reasons as descriptive equality. One cannot 
declare two or more persons to be morally or legally equal without 
first possessing a moral or legal standard - or rule - for governing 
the way people in their situation should be treated. Yet once one 
possesses such a rule, one knows everything there is to know about 
how the people are morally or legally to be treated. If the people are 
morally or legally identical by reference to the rule, it follows that 
they are prescriptively equal and, hence, should be treated equally in 
accord with the rule. If they are morally or legally nonidentical by 
reference to the rule, it follows that they are prescriptively unequal 
by reference to the rule and, hence, should be treated unequally in 
accord with the rule.22 To call them prescriptively equal or unequal, 
22. It is a truism that people who are morally or legally "equal" should therefore be 
"treated equally," and that people who are morally or legally ''unequal" should therefore be 
"treated unequally." Why? Because it follows logically from a determination that two persons 
are "equal" by reference to a given normative rule that they are to be "treated" as "equals" in 
accord with the rule. As Felix Oppenheim puts it, to say "equals should be treated equally" 
(and ''unequals should be treated unequally") is nothing but a tautological way of talking 
about the meaning of rules. F. OPPENHEIM, POLITICAL CONCEPTS: A RECONSTRUCTION 119-
20 (1981). ("It is logically impossible for any rule of distribution to treat either equals un-
equally or unequals equally, in the sense of allotting the same benefit or burden (in the same 
amount) to persons who differ [with respect to) the characteristics singled out by the rule, or 
different shares to persons whom the rule places in the same category"). 
Professor Chemerinsky denies that the axiom of Equality (E) -i.e., the axiom that "likes 
should be treated alike" -is tautological in the foregoing sense. See Chemerinsky, In Defense 
of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, text accompanying note 20. 
He bases his denial on two distinct arguments. First, he denies that E is "circular." E would 
be circular, he says, if two conditions were satisfied: (1) if the term (t) "likes" were synony-
mous with the phrase (p) "[those who) should be treated alike;" and (2) if p in tum were 
synonymous with t. Unfortunately, he says, while condition (1) is true, condition (2) is false. 
Condition (1) is true, because t does meanp: The answer to the question "Who are 'like' 
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however, adds nothing to what one has already determined to be the 
content of the moral or legal rule by which they should be treated. 
The terms "equal" and "unequal" in law and morals are nothing but 
people?" is indeed "those who should be treated alike." But condition (2) is false, he says 
because p does not meant: The answer to the question "Who are 'those who should be treated 
alike?' " is not "'like' people." 
Professor Chemerinsky is right about everything except the last step. He is right to stipu-
late that "likes" by reference to a rule are those persons for whom the rule prescribes like 
treatment. By that stipulation, however, it follows that those persons a rule requires to be 
treated alike are also "likes" by reference to the rule. Why? Because the rule is stipulated to 
be the sole and exclusive measure by which "likes" and "like" treatment can be ascertained. 
Second, Professor Chemerinsky challenges a tautological interpretation of E by offering an 
alternative interpretation - an interpretation that allegedly renders E morally plausible with-
out rendering it circular. E, he says, should be understood as a prescription for second-best 
choices. The first-best choice, of course, is to see that people who are defined to be "alike" by 
prevailing rules should be "treated alike" in accord with such rules. However, if for some 
reason one cannot give such persons the treatment to which they are alike entitled under the 
rules, the second-best response is to give them some other like treatment - that is, to treat 
them alike in some other way, rather than to distinguish between them. Chemerinsky, supra, 
text accompanying notes 10-12. Thus, if the rules entitle all Rhodes Scholars to receive schol-
arships to Magdalen College, the first-best response is to give them all scholarships to Magda-
len College. However, if one cannot give them all the treatment to which they are alike 
entitled, the second-best response is to treat them alike by reference to some other rule, e.g., to 
deny them all scholarships or give them all scholarships to University College, or to give them 
all half scholarships. It is£, Chemerinsky says, that tells us that the latter responses are all 
better than the response of giving scholarships to some Rhodes Scholars while denying them to 
others. 
The foregoing argument has several flaws. For one thing, E says nothing on its face about 
being a rule of preference. It does not instruct an actor first to give a class of people the 
treatment to which they are entitled and then (if the former is impossible) to give them some 
other like treatment. It states, rather, that people who are "alike" are invariably entitled to one 
thing - to be "treated alike." Furthermore, even if E is interpreted to be a "second-best" 
preference for always treating classes as classes, it nevertheless fails, because it is false. It is 
simply false to say that treating members of a class as a class is always preferable to distin-
guishing among them. It is not preferable, for example, to boil all Rhodes Scholars in oil than 
to give scholarships to some of them and not to others. Nor is it obviously preferable to deny 
scholarships to all of them than to give scholarships to all but the least deserving of them. 
This is not to say that it is never a better course of second-best conduct to treat members of 
a class by a rule of common treatment than to discriminate among them. Obviously it is 
sometimes better. The point is, rather, that whether or not it is better depends not on any 
general axiom of equality, but on the moral significance of the particular treatment to which 
the class members are all entitled, the particular rule of common treatment they received in-
stead, and the particular discrimination that is being avoided. In some cases, the moral injury 
inflicted by discriminating in a certain way is greater than the injury done by denying all 
members of the class the treatment to which they are entitled; thus, the moral injury inflicted 
by discriminating among Rhodes Scholars on the basis of race or religion may be greater than 
the injury inflicted by denying all of them scholarships. In other cases, the injury inflicted by 
discriminating among members of a class is less than the injury done by denying them all that 
to which they are entitled; thus, the injury inflicted by discriminating among diabetics on the 
basis of age or marital status or number of dependents may be less than the injury inflicted by 
denying them all life-saving insulin . .[fit is better to deny all members ofa class their due than 
to discriminate against them, it is not because denial is always better or usually better than 
discrimination. It is because as between the two moral rules at issue, the rule against injuring a 
person on the basis of the particular discrimination at hand (say, injuring a person by stigma-
tizing him as inferior on grounds of race) has higher moral priority than the rule against injur-
ing a person by denying the particular entitlement at issue (say, denying him a scholarship to 
Magdalen College). 
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"rhetorical" devices for talking about legal and moral rules.23 
Consider, for example, whether or not people are morally or le-
gally "equal before the law." To answer the question, one must first 
agree upon the prescriptive standard by which "equal" and "une-
qual" are to be measured. The same holds for any question of 
equality. One cannot decide whether two sticks of wood are descrip-
tively equal or unequal in length without first agreeing upon a stan-
dard for measuring length, because sticks that are equal by one 
measure of length may be unequal by another. Sticks that are equal 
as measured in whole inches may be unequal as measured in quarter 
inches; sticks that are equal as measured in millimeters may be une-
qual as measured in microns or angstroms.24 What prescriptive stan-
dard, then, does one implicitly have in mind in asking whether 
people are equal or unequal "before the law"? Three possible stan-
dards of measure come to mind. By virtue of the first standard, no 
people as a whole are equal anywhere in the world; by the second 
standard, all people as a whole are equal everywhere in the world; 
by the third standard, people as a whole are equal in some societies 
and unequal in others.25 
23. [A]n explicit rule of constitutional equality, such as the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, does not add anything distinct from and independent of the other 
rights (to liberty, security, due process, etc.) already enumerated in or implied by other 
J>rovisions of the constitution. Since these other constitutional rights apply to all citizens, 
their form already entails their equal application. The explicit principle of constitutional 
equality serves only a rhetorical purpose reminding us of the nature of other constitutional 
principles. 
R. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY 223 (1980) (emphasis ad-
ded). See also Raz, Principles of Equality, 87 MIND 321, 334 (1978) ("Arguments and claims 
invoking 'equality' ... are rhetorical."); Weale, An Anti-egalitarian Fallacy, 52 Phil. 352, 354 
(1977) (emphasis added): 
If statements of the form "All X's are equal with respect of F 1, F2,, F 3, ••• , Fn" are 
interpreted as statements about shared properties, they can be expressed in the logically 
equivalent form of the usual universal quantification: "For anything, if it is X then it is 
alsoF1, F 2,F3, • • • ,F0 ". There is an obvious question here: if this is so, why not express 
the claim simply as one about shared properties, instead of bringing in the rhetorical flour-
ish of referring to equality? 
24. See Evans, Equality, Ambiguity, and Public Choice, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1385, 1393 
(1981) ("Whether or not persons or things are equal depends in part on the scales used to 
compare them. Two distances may be the same when measured in miles, but different when 
measured with a micrometer."). 
25. I do not mean to suggest by this that these three are the only possible standards defin-
ing the extent to which persons are "equal before the law." J.R. Lucas, for one, has suggested 
four others: (1) The law shall regulate all people in accordance with "antecedently promul-
gated" rules; (2) The courts shall decide all disputes concerning people "after hearing argu-
ments on both sides"; (3) The law shall regulate all people ''fairly and impartially, without fear 
or favor"; (4) The courts shall ensure that both sides to disputes are "evenly matched" in their 
access to counsel. J. LUCAS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLmCS 246, 253, 255 (1966). 
The foregoing standards are very different from one another. Standard (1) is either trivial 
or untenable, depending upon what "antecedently promulgated" means: if Standard (1) 
means that no person can be regulated except in accord with known rules that leave no ques-
tion as to his rights and duties, no legal system does or can satisfy the Standard, because no 
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Standard I: "The law shall regulate people without classifying 
them on the basis of traits or activities that distinguish them from 
one another." By suggesting people are equal before the law, one 
may be comparing people - and therein finding them to be identical 
to one another - by reference to the prescriptive rule that the law 
ought not to classify people on the basis of their traits or activities. It 
is obvious, however, that no people in any legal system are equal 
before the law in that sense. Every legal system regulates people by 
classifying them in accord with what it defines to be their relevant 
traits and activities.26 It follows, therefore, that people who are clas-
sified differently from one another for given purposes are necessarily 
"unequal before the law" by Standard 1.27 
Standard II: "The law shall regulate people without distinguish-
ing among them except in accord with the traits and activities by 
which the law deems it appropriate to classify them." As we have 
seen, to say all people are "equal before the law" cannot possibly 
mean that they are all indistinguishable before the law, because 
every legal system regulates people by distinguishing between them 
in accord with the traits and activities it deems relevant. If people 
are truly equal before the law, therefore, it must be by reference to 
some standard of comparison other than Standard I. One possibility 
legal system is capable of making explicit in advance everyone's rights and duties; if Standard 
(1) means that no one may be regulated except in accord with rulings derived from or traceable 
lo known rules, every legal system in the western world satisfies the Standard (I). 
Standards (2) and (4) govern courts rather than legislatures and are well-known features of 
what lawyers in this country would view as the fundamentals of procedural due process. 
Standard (3) - the requirement that the law treat people "impartially without fear or 
favor'' - is entirely derivative in nature. It presupposes still further external standards defin-
ing the persons to whom partiality may and may not be shown and, given such standards, 
merely restates the obligation to follow such standards. See text accompanying notes 68-78 
infra. 
26. See Toll v. Moreno, 102 S. Ct. 2977, 2997 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("All laws 
classify, and, unremarkably, the characteristics that distinguish the classes so created have 
been judged relevant by the legislators responsible for the enactment."); accord, Clements v. 
Fashing, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 2845 (1982) ("c/ass!ftcalion is the essence of all legislation") (emphasis 
added). 
27. Consider a hypothetical murder statute: "All persons of sound mind who knowingly 
commit homicide without justification or excuse shall be guilty of murder." The statute classi-
fies people on the basis of the particular trait of "soundness of mind" and the particular activ-
ity of "committing homicide." People who are classified together for purposes of murder 
under the statute are interchangeable with one another for purposes of murder, just as people 
who are classified differently under the statute are noninterchangeable for purposes of murder. 
All persons of unsound mind are interchangeable with one another in respect of their 
nonculpability under the statute, just as they are noninterchangeable with all persons of sound 
mind. It follows from the statute, therefore, that while all persons of unsound mind are "equal 
before the law'' under Standard I, persons of unsound mind and persons of sound mind are 
not all "equal before the law" under Standard I. See generally Oppenheim, The Concepts of 
Equality, 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 102, 103 (1968) ("Every 
conceivable rule treats equals (in some specified respect) equally and unequals unequally."), 
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is by a standard that explicitly permits people to be classified. Thus, 
by declaring people "equal before the law," one may mean to be 
comparing people to one another - and therein finding them to be 
identical - by reference to the prescriptive rule that the law ought 
not to distinguish between people except in accord with the traits 
and activities it deems relevant. By that standard, however, every 
legal system necessarily treats people as "equal before the law," be-
cause, tautologically, every legal system considers people as indistin-
guishable except insofar as it considers them distinguishable.28 
Consider the legal status of black freedmen in America before the 
Civil War. In most antebellum states free persons "of color" were by 
law treated like whites for some purposes, and like slaves for other 
purposes: like whites, they were generally entitled to marry, con-
tract, own personal property, sue and be sued; like slaves, they were 
generally prohibited from voting, from serving as jurors, and from 
holding public offi.ce.29 The law treated them as legally indistin-
guishable from whites except where it deemed them to be legally 
distinguishable. By reference to Standard II, therefore, all antebel-
lum persons - whites, free persons of color, and slaves - were le-
gally identical and, hence, "equal before the law." 
Standard III: "The law shall regulate people without classifying 
them in such a way as to render them either unanswerable to others 
or unprotected from others." As a measure of whether people are 
equal before the law, Standard I is interesting but untenable, while 
Standard II is tenable but uninteresting. There is, however, another 
possibility. By "equal before the law," one may mean to be compar-
ing people - and therein finding them identical - by reference to 
the prescriptive rule that no one should be "above" the law (in the 
sense of being unanswerable to the law for his activities) or "outside" 
the law (in the sense of being unprotected by the law in his activi-
ties).30 By that standard, some legal systems treat people as equals, 
others do not. Consider what appears to have been the situation in 
thirteenth-century England. The King of England was defined by 
law as being above the law in the sense of being legally unanswer-
able to others for his conduct,3I just as certain "outlaws" of the time 
28. See note 26 supra. 
29. See generally I. BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTE-
BELLUM SOUTH 3-132 {1974); L. LITWAK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE 
STATES, 1790-1860, at 3-112 (1961). 
30. See J. LUCAS, supra note 25, at 253 ("nobody is so lowly as not to have recourse to the 
courts, nobody is so mighty as not to have to answer to the courts: anybody can invoke the 
courts' aid, everybody must render them obedience"). 
31. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,458 (1793) ("But in the case of the King, 
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were defined by law as being outside the protection of the law.32 Us-
ing Standard III as a standard of comparison, one would say that the 
King and outlaws were legally nonidentical to other citizens - and, 
hence, legally ''unequal" to them - because while other citizens 
were answerable in and protected by the courts, the King and out-
laws were not. Using the same prescriptive standard as comparison 
today, one would probably say that in America all persons are le-
gally identical to one another by reference to Standard III and, 
hence, are "equal" before the law.33 
In sum, just as one cannot know whether two sticks of wood are 
descriptively equal in length without first agreeing upon a descrip-
tive standard of comparison, one cannot know whether people are 
prescriptively "equal before the law" before first agreeing upon a 
prescriptive standard of comparison. Yet once one possesses such a 
prescriptive standard, one knows everything to be known about how 
people should be treated in that respect. All further statements of 
equality and inequality merely restate the logical relationships of 
identity and nonidentity that exist among people by reference to the 
standard. By Standard I, for e~ample, no people anywhere are equal 
before the law or anywhere entitled to be treated equally; by Stan-
dard II people everywhere are equal before the law and everywhere 
entitled to be treated equally; by Standard III, people in the thir-
the sovereignty . • . [w]hile it vested him with jurisdiction over others, it excluded all others 
from jurisdiction over him. With regard to him, there was no superior power; and conse-
quently, on feudal principles, no right of jurisdiction."); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 
34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) ("It is a principle of the English constitution that the King 
can do no wrong, that no blame can be imputed to him, that he cannot be named in de-
bate. . . . By the constitution of Great Britain, the crown is hereditary, and the monarch can 
never be a subject."); J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27 (2d ed. 1921) (The 
King of England is "commonly" said to be a person ''who has rights though no duties."). 
32. See 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *319-20: 
[A]nciently an outlawed felon was said to have caput lupinum, and might be knocked on 
the head like a wolf, by anyone that should meet him, because, having renounced all law, 
he was to be dealt with as in a state of nature, when everyone that should find him might 
slay him. 
See also Drew v. Drew, 37 Me. 389, 391 (1854): 
The word outlaw has a distinct technical signification, and when used in that sense refers 
to persons, and not to things. Thus, an outlaw is one who is put out of the law; that is, 
deprived of its benefits and protection. In earlier times he was called afriendlesman; one 
who could not, by law, have a friend. An outlaw was said caput genere /upinum, by which 
it was meant, that anyone might knock him on the head as a wolf, in case he would not 
surrender himself peaceably when taken. 
Interestingly, Thomas Jefferson tried unsuccessfully in 1779 to revive the obsolescent insti-
tution of "outlawry" by urging the Virginia legislature to adopt legislation that would have 
declared any ''white woman" who failed to leave the state within one year of having a child 
"by a negro or mulatto" to be "out of the protection of the laws." 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 471 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). 
33. But see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2690, 2711 (1982) (White, J,, dissenting) (sug-
gesting that vesting absolute immunity in the office of the President places the President above 
the law). 
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teenth century were unequal before the law, while people in the 
United States today are equal before the law. To talk of their equal-
ity or inequality, however, merely expresses what we already know 
about the three Standards: that the prescriptive rule against distin-
guishing people on the basis of their traits and activities does not 
apply anywhere to people whom the law deems distinguishable; that 
the rule against distinguishing people whom the law deems indistin-
guishable applies everywhere to all people; and that the rule against 
treating people as above or outside the law did not apply to all peo-
ple in thirteenth-century England, but does apply to all people in the 
United States today. 
B. The Meaning of "All Men Are Created Equal" 
Lincoln and Douglas misperceived the derivative meaning of 
equality in moral and legal discourse and, misperceiving it, allowed 
it to confuse their debate. They professed to disagree about whether 
blacks and whites were "created equal." Yet in reality their disa-
greement was not about equality or inequality at all. They agreed 
that blacks and whites were prescriptively equal in some respects, 
and unequal in other respects. Their real disagreement was not 
about equality, but about the content of the prescriptive standard 
that ought to determine the equality or inequality of blacks and 
whites in one particular respect - their capacity for enslavement. 
Lincoln and Douglas overlooked that assertions of equality and 
inequality in law and morals have no meaning apart from the con-
tent of the prescriptive rules they necessarily incorpqrate by refer-
ence. Blacks and whites cannot be declared descriptively or 
prescriptively equal without reference to some descriptive or pre-
scriptive standard for measuring their identity or nonidentity. Yet 
once such a standard obtains, relationships of equality or inequality 
ensue automatically. To declare blacks and whites equal or unequal 
is merely a way of talking about relationships that obtain among 
them as a "logical consequence"34 of measuring them by given de-
34. See C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 38 (J. 
Petrie trans. 1963). 
This is not to say that the process of formulating prescriptive rules - or the process of 
applying them in contested cases - is wholly a process of logic. Obviously it is not. Logic 
alone cannot dictate standards of right and wrong, or dictate how such standards apply in 
contested cases. Moral judgment is needed in both cases, both to formulate moral rules in 
broad terms and to particularize their meanings in contested cases. The point is, rather, that 
once one has made such moral judgments, certain relationships follow analytically as a conse-
quence. Once one has formulated moral rules and particularized their meaning in cases at 
hand, it logically follows that persons are either morally identical by reference to such rules, or 
morally nonidentical by reference to such rules. If they are morally identical, they are morally 
"equal" by the relevant measure; if they are morally nonidentical, they are morally "unequal." 
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scriptive or prescriptive standards. 
Had they understood the logic of equality, Lincoln and Douglas 
would have realized that they did not - and logically could not -
disagree as to whether blacks and whites are equal. Blacks and 
whites are undeniably equal to one another, just as they are undenia-
bly unequal. Like all persons and things, blacks and whites are un-
deniably equal to one another by some descriptive standards, and 
unequal by others: descriptively unequal by descriptive standards of 
skin pigmentation; descriptively equal by the descriptive standard of 
possessing human skin. By the same token, blacks and whites are 
undeniably equal by some prescriptive standards, and unequal by 
others: prescriptively equal by the rule "no person shall be denied a 
job on account of his race;" prescriptively unequal by the rule "no 
black person shall be denied a job because of his race." 
As to the justness or rightness of particular prescriptive rules, 
Lincoln and Douglas largely agreed with one another. They agreed, 
for example, that blacks and whites were - and rightly were - pre-
scriptively equal with respect to the contemporary rule that prohib-
ited persons of either race from marrying persons of the other race. 
That is to say, they agreed on the justness of the prescriptive rule -
"no person of either the Negro or Caucasian race shall marry a per-
son of the other race."35 Measured by the ban on miscegenation, 
blacks and whites were identical and, thus, equal: whites were pro-
hibited from marrying blacks for the same reason and to the same 
extent as blacks were prohibited from marrying whites.36 Presuma-
Why? Because that is precisely what "equal" and "unequal" mean. See Westen, On "Co,yus-
ing Ideas'~· Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153, 1164 n.41 (1982). 
35. See Speech of Stephen A. Douglas at Chicago, July 9, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUG• 
LAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 12 ("I am opposed to Negro equality. I repeat that ... I am in 
favor of preserving not only the purity of the blood, but the purity ofth~ government from any 
mixture or amalgamation with inferior races."); Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Charleston, 
Sept. 18, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 136 ("I will say then that 
I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political 
equality of the white and black races - that I am not nor ever have been in favor of .•• 
qualifying (Negroes] ... to intermarry with white people •... "); id. at 136 ("I will also add 
. . . that I have never had the least apprehension that I or my friends would marry negroes if 
there was no law to keep them from it; but as Judge Douglas and his friends seem to be in 
great apprehension that they might, if there were no law to keep them from it, I give him the 
most solemn pledge that I will to the very last stand by the law of this State, which forbids the 
marrying of white people with negroes."). For more on Lincoln's racial views, see L. Cox, 
LINCOLN AND BLACK FREEDOM: A STUDY IN PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP ()981); B. 
QUARLES, LINCOLN AND THE NEGRO (1962); Frederickson, A Man Bui Nol a Brother: Abra-
ham Lincoln and Racial Equality, 41 J.S. HlsT. 39 (1975); Fehrenbacher, Only His Slepcl1ildren: 
Lincoln and the Negro, 20 C1v. WAR HIST. 293 (1974). 
36. Measured by the prohibition on interracial marriage, a black wishing to marry a white 
is legally identical to a white wishing to marry a black, just as a black wishing to marry a black 
is legally identical to a white wishing to marry a white. That is why the Supreme Court, 
passing on the constitutionality of a state statute that punished interracial fornication more 
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bly, Lincoln and Douglas would have also agreed with the many 
other prescriptive rules of the day, north and south, by which blacks 
and whites were rendered identical and thus equal: that no person, 
black or white, slave or free, was allowed to kill another person with 
malice aforethought; that every person, black and white, slave and 
free, had a right not to be killed with malice aforethought; that no 
person of any race was allowed to incite an insurrection or revolt of 
slaves; and so forth.37 These prescriptive standards drew no distinc-
seriously than intraracial fornication, was able to say that the statute treated blacks and whites 
equally: "Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two sections 
[of the Alabama code] is directed against the offence designated and not against the person of 
any particular color or race. The punishment of each offending person, whether white or 
black, is the same." Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583,585 (1883). That, too, is why the state of 
Virginia was able to argue that its antimiscegenation statute treated blacks and whites equally. 
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1967) ("[T]he state argues that the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause . . . is only that the state penal laws containing an interracial element 
as part of the definition of the offense must apply equally to whites and Negroes in the sense 
that members of each race are punished to the same degree."). 
This is not to say that an antimiscegenation statute is "equal" within the meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause. It depends on whether the legal classifications the antimiscegenation 
statute creates are consistent with the legal classifications the Equal Protection Clause creates. 
If an antimiscegenation statute defines as identical and nonidentical, respectively, people 
whom the Equal Protection Clause allows to be so defined, then the antimiscegenation statute 
is constitutional - just as race-based antifornication statutes were held to be constitutional in 
Pace. If, on the other hand, an antimiscegenation statute defines as identical and nonidentical, 
respectively, people whom the Equal Protection Clause prohibits from being so defined, the 
statute is unconstitutional - just as the Virginia antimiscegenation statute was held to be 
unconstitutional in Loving. To decide the question, one must identify the constitutional stan-
dard prescribed by the Equal Protection Clause. Assume, for example, that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is taken to prohibit the state from selectively imposing disqualifications on 
disfavored racial groups that lack fair representation in the political branches of government. 
See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77-87, 145-61 (1980). By the latter standard, 
antimiscegenation statutes may not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because they impose 
the very same disqualification on majority whites as they impose on minority blacks. Now 
assume, on the other hand, that the Equal Protection Clause is taken to prohibit the state from 
stigmatizing disfavored racial groups, see, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,357 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.), or 
from denying persons opportunities based on their race, see, e.g., Univ. of Cal. Regents v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-99 (opinion of Powell, J.). By the latter standards, antimiscegenation 
statutes do violate the Equal Protection Clause. They selectively stigmatize blacks, because 
they rest on the premise that as between the two races, blacks are an i'!ferior race unfit to 
intermarry with whites. See Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,407 (1857) (colonial antimis-
cegenation laws "show that a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to be erected 
between the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery . . . and which they 
then looked upon as so far below them in the scale of created beings, that intermarriages 
between white persons and negroes or mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral 
. . . . And no distinction in this respect was made between the free negro or mulatto and the 
slave, but this stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole race."). They also 
deny persons opportunities based on race, because they prevent A from marrying B merely 
because ofA!r race. 
31. See, e.g., GA. CODE§ 4953 (1861) ("Any person who shall maliciously kill or maim a 
slave, shall suffer such punishment as would be inflicted in case the like offense had been 
committed on a free white person."); GA. CODE§ 4217 (same); 2 J. HURD, THE LAW OF FREE-
DOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 91, 157-58, 191, 199 (1862) (statutes of various 
states providing the same penalties for slaves committing murder); K. STAMPP, THE PARTICU-
LAR INSTITUTION 227 (1956) ("The southern codes did not prescribe lighter penalties for slaves 
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tion between blacks and whites. For purposes of the prescriptions, 
blacks and whites were prescriptively equal. 
At the same time, Lincoln and Douglas also agreed that blacks 
and whites were - and rightly were - prescriptively unequal by 
other contemporary rules. They agreed, for example, that whites 
and blacks were rightly unequal with respect to the prescriptive stan-
dard governing eligibility to vote. That is, they agreed on the just-
ness of the prescriptive rule- "no Negro shall be eligible to vote."38 
Measured by that particular standard, blacks and whites were not 
prescriptively identical and, thus, not equal. Lincoln and Douglas 
also agreed on the justness of other common prescriptions of the day 
by which blacks and whites were rendered nonidentical and thus un-
equal: that no person was allowed to serve as a juror, or to hold 
public office, or enjoy the status of "citizen," unless he was white.39 
who murdered other slaves than for slaves who murdered whites."); GA. CODE§ 4214 (1861) 
(any white person who attempts to excite "an insurrection or revolt of slaves," shall be pun-
ished with death"); GA. CODE§ 4704-06 (1861) (any slave or free person of color who attempts 
to induce "slaves" to join in "an insurrection" shall be punished with death). 
Lincoln presumably agreed with such statutes because he made a point of emphasizing that 
he believed blacks were as much entitled to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" as "the 
white man." Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Ottawa, Aug. 21, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUG• 
LAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 75. Douglas, too, presumably believed in the statutes, because 
he repeatedly emphasized that though he did not consider whites and blacks equal, he believed 
that we "ought to extend to the negro every right, every privilege, every immunity which he is 
capable of enjoying, consistent with the good of society." Speech of Stephen A. Douglas at 
Jonesboro, Sept. 15, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 117. 
38. See Speech of Stephen A. Douglas at Jonesboro, Sept. 15, 1858, in THE LINCOLN· 
DouGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 117 ("I, for one, am utterly opposed to Negro sutfr&ge 
anywhere and under any circumstances"); Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Charleston, Sept. 18, 
1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES,supra note 3, at 136 ("I will say then that I am not, 
nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way social and political equality of the 
white and black races - that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters ••. of 
Negroes .... "); id. at 156 ("I am not in favor of negro citizenship .... Now my opinion is 
that the different states have the power to make a negro a citizen under the Constitution of the 
United States if they choose. The Dred Scott decision decides that they nave not that power. 
If the State of Illinois had that power I should be opposed to the exercise of it. That is all I 
have to say about it."). 
39. See Speech of Stephen A. Douglas at Chicago, July 9, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUG• 
LAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 12 ("Illinois has ... decided that the Negro shall not be a slave, 
and we have at the same time decided that he shall not . . . serve on juries, or enjoy political 
privileges. I am content with that system of policy which we have adopted for ourselves."); 
Speech of Stephen A. Douglas at Jonesboro, Sept. 15, 1858, in The LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DE• 
BATES, supra note 3, at 116 ("I hold that a Negro is not and never ought to be a citizen of the 
United States .... I do not believe that the Almighty made the negro capable of self-govern-
ment."); id. at 117 (criticizing Maine for allowing Negroes to vote and hold public office); 
Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Charleston, Sept. 18, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DE-
BATES, supra note 3, at 136; id. at 156 ("I am not in favor of Negro citizenship"). 
This is not to say that blacks in antebellum America were nowhere allowed to vote, hold 
office, or enjoy the other privileges of citizenship. Some states did extend to blacks the privi-
leges of voting, sitting as jurors, and holding public office. The overwhelming majority of 
states, however, both north and south, denied blacks such privileges. See I. BERLIN, supra note 
29, at 90-91, 129, 131; L. LITWACK, supra note 29, at 58, 60, 75, 93-94. 
Lincoln's views regarding blacks, it must be admitted, are not entirely unambiguous. At 
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By those standards, blacks and whites were legally unequal and, 
hence, to be treated unequally in accord with them. 
Unfortunately, Lincoln and Douglas de.fined the issue between 
them in such a way as to confuse their real debate in two distinct 
respects. First, by assuming that whites and blacks must be either 
prescriptively equal or prescriptively unequal, they failed to recog-
nize how fully they agreed on the justness of prescriptive standards 
that together rendered whites and blacks equal in some respects and 
unequal in others. Second, and more seriously, by framing their is-
sue in terms of equality, they failed to recognize that their real dis-
pute was not about the equality or inequality of blacks and whites, 
but about the content of the prescriptive rule that ought to govern 
the equality or inequality of blacks and whites in a particular respect 
- in respect of slavery. Lincoln believed that the just rule as envis-
aged by the Declaration of Independence was "No person, white or 
black, should be held in a condition of slavery."40 By Lincoln's pre-
times he suggested that he regarded blacks as forever unfit to be social and political equals to 
whites. See Lincoln's speeches, supra. At times he suggested that while American society was 
not ready to treat blacks as socially and politically equal to whites, equality as an abstract 
principle mandated at least resistance to extension of slavery into the territories. See Speech of 
Abraham Lincoln at Quincy, Oct. 13, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, 
at 213; Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Alton, Oct. 15, 1858, in The LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DE-
BATES, supra note 3, at 225-27. At times he suggested that blacks and whites could never live 
as social and political equals in America and, hence, that blacks must either be colonized 
elsewhere outside the territory of the United States, or maintained here as an inferior caste. 
Speech of Abraham Lincoln, at Ottawa, Aug. 21, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, 
supra note 3, at 74-75; Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Charleston, Sept. 18, 1858, in THE 
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES,supra note 3, at 136; Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Galesburg, 
October 7, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 179. Lincoln's appar-
ent equivocation has led scholars to disagree about his real position regarding blacks. Com-
pare Frederickson, supra note 35 (arguing that Lincoln did not really believe blacks were 
equal to whites but merely that blacks were human and, hence, unfit for slavery), with L. Cox, 
supra note 35, at 36 (arguing that Lincoln believed blacks and whites were inherently equal, 
despite the fact that the country in 1860 was not yet ready to accept it). Lincoln's apparent 
equivocation led Douglas to argue that Lincoln's views lacked integrity - that Lincoln argued 
for social and political equality to Abolitionist audience~ in northern Illinois, and argued 
against such equality to more conservative audiences in southern Illinois. See Speech of Ste-
phen A. Douglas at Charleston, Sept. 18, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES,,supra 
note 3, at 154-55. But see H. JAFFA, supra note 4, at 365-68. ' 
40. See Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Chicago, July 10, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS 
DEBATES, supra note 3, at 18; Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Ottawa, Aug. 21, 1858, in THE 
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 74-75; Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Charles-
ton, Sept. 18, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 136; Speech of Abra-
ham Lincoln at Alton, Oct. 15, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 
225-27. At the same time, it should be pointed out that while Lincoln expressed a personal 
repugnance toward slavery and held the view that the Declaration of Independence envisaged 
slavery's ultimate extinction, Lincoln emphasized that he did not wish to do anything to inter-
fere with the institution of slavery in the states where it already existed, see Speech of Abra-
ham Lincoln at Ottawa, Aug. 21, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 
74-75, and that his principal objective was to prevent the spread of slavery into the new territo-
ries. See Speech of Abraham Lincoln at Alton, Oct. 15, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS 
DEBATES, supra note 3, at 227-35. 
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scriptive standard, blacks and whites were undeniably equal and, 
hence, entitled to be treated accordingly. Douglas believed in con-
trast that the just rule was "No person, white or black, shall be held 
in a condition of slavery, unless the white people of a state provide 
otherwise regarding blacks residing within the state."41 By Doug-
las's prescriptive standard, whites and blacks were undeniably une-
qual and, hence, entitled to be treated accordingly. The two men 
disagreed not about whether blacks and whites were prescriptively 
equal, but about the prescriptive standard by which their equality or 
inequality should be measured. 
If asked, of course, Lincoln might have said that while he be-
lieved the rule against slavery should apply to blacks and whites 
alike, he did so because of a prior belief that blacks and whites were 
equal in that respect. Yet, logically, that cannot have been the case 
- any more than Douglas could logically have arrived at his pre-
scriptive rule by virtue of a prior belief that blacks and whites were 
unequal. For to say blacks and whites are prescriptively equal pre-
supposes an anterior prescriptive standard by which blacks and 
whites are rendered identical. Equality and inequality for Lincoln 
and Douglas were not the sources of their respective views of slavery, 
but the products of their views of slavery. By neglecting the logic of 
equality, they allowed the language of equality to mask their respec-
tive views of slavery, not to illuminate them. 
So what do we say about the issue that divided Lincoln and 
Douglas? Are blacks and whites prescriptively equal or not? The 
answer is obvious: they are equal in respect of some prescriptive 
rules, and unequal in respect of others. The real question, therefore, 
is not "equal or unequal," but "equal in what respect."42 Where 
people agree that blacks and whites should be regarded as prescrip-
tively equal, equality ceases to interest them, because they necessar-
ily agree on the prescriptive rules by which blacks and whites should 
be treated. Where people disagree that blacks and whites should be 
regarded as prescriptively equal, equality ceases to help them, be-
cause (like Lincoln and Douglas) they necessarily disagree on the 
prescriptive rules by which blacks and whites should be treated _,.,. 
and, hence, on the prescriptive standard by which equality and ine-
quality are ascertained. 
41. See Speech of Stephen A. Douglas at Springfield, June 17, 1858, in THE LINCOLN· 
DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 11-13; Speech of Stephen A. Douglas at Bloomington, 
July 16, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, at 37-39; Speech of Stephen 
A. Douglas at Galesburg, October 7, 1858, in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 3, 
at 76-77. 
42. See J. LUCAS, supra note 25, at 244-45. 
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II. THE EMPTINESS OF EQUALITY 
Professors Chemerinsky and D' Amato deny that equality is mor-
ally and legally empty. They deny, that is, that statements of pre-
scriptive equality derive their entire normative meaning from 
anterior prescriptive standards governing the way people should be 
treated. They argue instead that equality is an independent norm 
with moral and legal force of its own, a norm that exists apart from 
whatever prescriptive rules may otherwise prevail. Together they ar-
gue that while prescriptive standards may be necessary for norma-
tive discourse, such standards cannot always be sufficient, because 
equality performs three essential functions that cannot be served in 
any other way: (A) equality focuses attention on areas of potential 
injustice, by identifying prescriptive rules that treat people un-
equally; (B) it provides moral and legal guidance as to how to re-
spond to such rules, by creating a rebuttable presumption against 
rules that treat people unequally; (C) it imposes moral and legal lim-
its on the kinds of justifications that can be advanced to rebut the 
presumption against unequal treatment, by prohibiting the presump-
tion from being rebutted in the name of arbitrariness, inconsistency, 
or partiality. 
I think Professors Chemerinsky and D' Amato are mistaken. In-
deed, like Lincoln and Douglas before them, they make the mistake 
of talking about equality without attending to what equality means. 
Professors Chemerinsky and D' Amato seem to believe they can talk 
about the equality or inequality of persons without making reference 
to anterior standards of comparison. They do not succeed. They 
succeed instead in doing something far more common: they talk 
about prescriptive equality and inequality - as everyone must - by 
implicit reference to anterior prescriptive standards of comparison; 
but by neglecting the logic of equality, they conceal from themselves 
and their audience the substantive content of the prescriptive stan-
dards they implicitly incorporate by reference. They purport to be 
assessing one set of prescriptive rules by reference to a norm of pre-
scriptive equality, while in reality they are assessing one set of pre-
scriptive rules by an anterior set of prescriptive rules. 
A. Equality as a Standard for Identifying Areas 
of Potential Injustice 
Professor Chemerinsky believes that the concept of equality per-
forms the vital function of alerting us to areas of potential injustice 
by focusing our attention on rules that treat people unequally. 
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Moral and legal rules, he says, can be divided into two distinct cate-
gories: rules that treat people equally; and rules that treat people 
unequally. Neither category is necessarily just or unjust. The justice 
or injustice of all rules - whether they treat people equally or un-
equally- ultimately depends upon whether the treatments they pro-
vide can be justified by external moral or legal standards. 
Nevertheless, he says, as between the two categories, rules treating 
people unequally are suspect in ways that rules treating people 
equally are not.43 The importance of the concept of equality, he says, 
is that it "focus[es]"44 our attention on a category of potentially un-
just rules that would otherwise go "unnoticed."45 
A good example, Professor Chemerinsky says, is the rule in Craig 
v. Boren46 that prohibited beer from being sold to men under the age 
of 21 and to women under the the age of 18. The statute was prem-
ised on evidence that men under the age of 21 were more likely to 
drive automobiles under the influence of beer. The statute was 
designed to minimize drunk driving on the part of a statistically sig-
nificant group of dangerous drivers by regulating their purchase of 
beer. The statute did not violate anyone's independent constitutional 
rights, he says, because men under the age of 21 have no constitu-
tional right either to drink beer or to drive automobiles. Nor did the 
statute violate constitutional standards of minimum rationality. Ab-
sent a concept of equality, therefore, the statute might well have 
passed unchallenged. The "only" thing that "compel[led] us to ask" 
if the statutory scheme was truly justified was the "perception of the 
inequality in treatment of men and women."47 It was our concept of 
equality that caused us to "focus"48 on an injustice that might other-
wise have gone "unremedied."49 
Professor Chemerinsky's argument, I am afraid, is premised on a 
fallacy. He proceeds from the premise that moral and legal rules can 
be placed in distinct categories, depending upon whether they treat 
people equally or unequally. He is mistaken. Prescriptive rules do 
not treat people either equally or unequally. They treat people both 
equally and unequally.50 Every prescriptive rule treats people as 
43. See Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply lo Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. 
REV. - (1983), text accompanying notes 27-28. 
44. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 52-53. 
45. Chemerinsky, supra note 33, text accompanying notes 55-59. 
46. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
47. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 34-35. 
48. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 52-53. 
49. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 55-56. 
50. See Oppenheim, supra note 27, at 102-03 ("Every conceivable rule treats equals (in 
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equals in some respects and as unequals in other respects, because 
every prescriptive rule can be stated in terms by which people are, 
variously, identical and nonidentical. Consider the rule in Craig v. 
Boren: 
It shall be unlawful for any person who holds a license to sell and 
dispense beer . . . to sell . . . to any minor any beverage containing 
more than one-half of one per cent of alcohol measured by volume and 
not more than three and two-tenths (3.2) per cent of alcohol measured 
by weight. 
"A 'minor,' . . . is defined as a female under the age of eighteen 
(18) years, and a male under the age of twenty-one (21) years.51 
Like any statute, the Craig statute can be stated as a prescription by 
which all people are identical and, hence, equal. It can be stated as 
follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell any beverage containing 
more than one-half of one percent of alcohol measured by volume and 
not more than three and two-tenths (3.2) percent of alcohol measured 
by weight, ff the person so selling holds a license to sell and dispense 
beer, and ff the person to whom he so sells is a female under the age of 
eighteen (18) years or a male under the age of twenty-one (21) years. 
By that statement of the statute, all people are prescriptively identi-
cal in two respects. They are all told that !f they hold a license to sell 
beer, they may not lawfully sell beer to persons who are under age as 
defined in the statute. In addition, all people are also prescriptively 
identical under the statute as objects of the prohibition. They are all 
told that !f they are men and if they are under 21 they are not per-
sons to whom beer may be lawfully sold by persons holding beer 
licenses.52 All people are prescriptively equal under the Craig statute 
in the same sense in which it is often and truthfully said that "all 
persons are equal before the law."53 They are all identical as "per-
some specified respect) equally and unequals unequally"); id at 103 ("any rule which allots 
'equal shares to equals' implicitly not only allots 'unequal shares to unequals' but also allots 
them 'in proportion to their inequality' "). 
51. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 191 n.l (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (1958 & 
Supp. 1976)). 
52. There is a sense in which men are certainly equal; for there is a sense in which moral 
rules apply to all men alike. All men must keep their promises, for example. But this just 
means that all men must keep their promises !f they have made any, just as all men, 
whether fathers or not, should care for their children !f they have any, and all men, 
whether murderers or not, should be hanged!fthey have committed murder, and all men, 
whether serfs or slaves or not, have the same duty to their overlord or owner !fthey have 
one. Hence the assertion that men have this kind of equality ... is of very little value, for 
it is compatible with their actual rights and duties being very different. 
J. HARRISON, HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 193 (1981). 
53. Again, we may be all equal before the law, in the sense that the law applies to every-
body, but in this sense our being equal before the law is compatible with the law's as-
signing to different people very different rights and duties. In this sense, a law which 
hangs coloured men for raping white women, but does not hang white men for raping 
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sons" to whom and about whom the law speaks. 
At the same time, however, the Craig statute also distinguishes 
among people by their traits and activities and, hence, treats them as 
nonidentical and unequal. It treats people who hold licenses to sell 
beer differently from people who hold licenses to sell wine; people 
who sell beverages ofless than one-half of one percent alcohol differ-
ently from people who sell beverages containing more than one half 
of one percent alcohol; people who sell to persons over 21 differently 
from people who sell to persons under 21; people who sell to women 
under the age of 21 differently from people who sell to men under 
the age of 21; and so forth. The same thing would also be true if all 
the foregoing features of the statute were eliminated. Assume, for 
example, that the statute were amended to apply to all persons who 
sell alcohol of any variety to anyone of any gender or age. The stat-
ute would still be premised on prescriptive standards by which some 
people are nonidentical and, hence, unequal to others. It would still 
treat persons who sell alcohol differently from those who do not; 
people who sell alcohol once differently from those who sell it re-
peatedly. People are inevitably unequal under the Craig statute in 
the same way, and for the same reason, that people are inevitably 
unequal under statutes that classify people on the basis of traits or 
activities. 
It follows, therefore, that since all rules treat people unequally in 
some respects, equality cannot perform the targeting function that 
Professor Chemerinsky ascribes to it. Equality cannot distinguish 
rules that do not require special scrutiny (because they treat people 
equally) from rules that do require special scrutiny (because they 
treat people unequally). The most it can do is distinguish the re-
spects in which such rules treat people equally from the respects in 
which such rules also treat people unequally. Accordingly, if one 
coloured women applies equally to all men; that they are all hanged !f they are coloured, 
treates all men alike in just the same way as does the rule that they are hanged !f they are 
murderers. Again, if there is a God, it seems reasonable to suppose that there is a sense in 
which all men are equal in his eyes, but, since it is improbable that he looks upon all men 
the same, it may just mean that he looks upon all men'the same unless there are reasons 
for looking upon them differently. And, of course, God may look upon all men the same 
in that he will look upon any man who is a saint differently from the way he looks on any 
man who is a sinner . . . . 
J. HARRISON, supra note 52, at 194. 
All principles are (sets of) statements of general reasons. As such they apply equally to all 
those who meet their condition of application. Generality implies equality of application 
to a class. Adding "equally" to the statement of the conditions or consequences of a 
principle does not necessarily turn it into one which has more to do with equality . 
. . . [A]ll principles of entitlement generate equality (in some respect) as an incidental 
by-product since all who have equal qualification under them have an equal entitlement. 
Raz, supra note 23, at 325-26, 333. See text accompanying notes 28-29, supra. 
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truly believes that rules that treat people equally do not deserve spe-
cial scrutiny and that rules that treat people unequally do, he faces 
two choices: he can conclude that because all rules necessarily treat 
people equally in at least one respect, no rule requires special scru-
tiny; or he can conclude that because all rules necessarily treat peo-
ple unequally in at least one respect, all rules require special 
scrutiny. But there is one thing he cannot do. He cannot find in the 
definitions of equality and inequality any principle for distinguish-
ing rules that require scrutiny from rules that do not. 
Why would an observer as perceptive as Professor Chemerinsky 
conclude otherwise? Why would he be induced to believe that 
equality and inequality could serve as a litmus test for identifying 
suspect rules? The answer, I believe, is that he confuses general con-
cepts of equality with the particular relationship of prescriptive 
equality that ensues from the particular prescriptive standard he 
happens to have in mind. By neglecting the derivative relationship 
that exists between statements of prescriptive equality and underly-
ing prescriptive standards, he mistakes the particular prescriptive 
standard he implicitly has in mind for the consequential relationship 
of equality that derives from it. He thinks he finds normative value 
in equality itself, while in reality he rediscovers in a particular rela-
tionship of equality the normative value prescribed by the particular 
standard that logically underlies it. 
To illustrate the confusion, consider the discussion of Craig v. Bo-
ren. Professor Chemerinsky is right that, constitutionally, the Craig 
statute was presumptively invalid. He is also right that the statute 
explicitly distinguished between men and women and thereby 
treated them unequally. He is wrong, however, in thinking the stat-
ute was presumptively invalid because it treated people unequally. 
Every statute treates people unequally in some respects. The statute 
was presumptively invalid not because it treated people unequally, 
but because it treated unequally people who by constitutional stan-
dards are presumptively equal. The Craig statute violated a four-
teenth amendment right of men which is analogous to, say, the 
fourth amendment right of persons to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. The fourth amendment prohibits the govern-
ment from subjecting any person to seizure unless the government 
has shown "[r]easonable" grounds for doing so.54 The fourteenth 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment has also been construed as a require-
ment that in most cases the determination of reasonableness be made by a neutral magistrate 
prior to the search. See generally Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Require-
ment, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603 (1982) (arguing that the exceptions to the so-called ''warrant 
requirement" be reconceptualized and reformulated). 
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amendment has been construed to prohibit the government from de-
nying any person opportunities or benefits on the basis of sex unless 
the government has sound reasons for doing so.55 By the latter pre-
scriptive standard, men and women are prescriptively identical in 
their right to challenge legislation that denies them opportunities or 
benefits on the basis of sex. It is the latter prescriptive standard, 
therefore, that renders men and women prescriptively equal and, 
hence, entitles them to be treated equally in that respect. It is the 
latter standard, too, that rendered the Craig statute presumptively 
invalid. The statute was presumptively invalid, and the statute 
treated men and women unequally. But the statute was not pre-
sumptively invalid because it treated men and women unequally. It 
was presumptively invalid because it violated the presumptive right 
of men not to be denied benefits or opportunities on the basis of sex 
- and thereby treated unequally in a particular respect persons 
whom the Constitution requires to be treated equally in that particu-
lar respect.56 
55. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3336-37 (1982). 
56. Professor Chemerinsky repeats the Craig fallacy in his hypothetical case on Social Se-
curity. See Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 10-12. He posits a hypothet-
ical Social Security statute that grants survivor benefits to widows but not to widowers, and 
then suggests that one can challenge the statute in the name of"equality" without reference to 
anterior entitlements. Again, he mistakes legal standards and entitlements for the derivative 
relationshi_ps of legal equality and inequality that they entail. If the Social Security statute 
were the highest law in the land, it could not be legally challenged in the name of equality 
because the legal identities and nonidentities the statute entailed - that is, its legal equalities 
and inequalities - would be legally supreme. If, on the other hand, the Social Security statute 
can be legally challenged in the name of equality, it is because and only because some higher 
legal standard exists by which men and women are rendered identical and thus equal. The 
higher legal standard Professor Chemerinsky has in mind, of course, is a fourteenth amend-
ment norm, - i.e., that no state shall deny any person benefits on the basis of sex. See, e.g., 
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 50 U.S.L.W. 5068 (U.S., June 29, 1982). By that legal 
standard, men and women are rendered legally identical for purposes of Social Security bene-
fits and, hence, legally equal. The statute in that event can be challenged in the name of equal-
ity - but only by virtue of an anterior fourteenth amendment standard from which such 
equality logically flows. The "equality" Professor Chemerinsky invokes is nothing but the 
relationship of identity that obtains between men and women as a consequence of the anterior 
fourteenth amendment standard he leaves unstated. 
Professor Chemerinsky is also wrong to suggest that prescriptive equality is prescriptively 
indifferent as to whether reJevant benefits are granted to ·all members of the relevant class or 
denied to them. Prescriptive equality is the relationship of identity that obtains among persons 
of a class by virtue of an anterior rule for the treatment of persons. To identify the treatment 
to which members of the class are entitled, one must consult the rule. If the rule prescribes 
that all members of the class are to be granted a certain benefit, then to deny them all that 
benefit is not to treat them as "equals" by reference to the rule. If, on the other hand, the rule 
prescribes that all members of the class be denied benefits, then to grant them all benefits is not 
to treat them as equals by reference to the rule. To illustrate, consider Professor Chemerin-
sky's hypothetical Social Security statute in the context of the fourteenth amendment. The 
legislature's first preference - a preference expressed in the statute - is to grant benefits to 
widows and not to widowers. The fourteenth amendment, in turn, prohibits the legislature 
from giving effect to its first preference, because the fourteenth amendment prohibits the legis-
lature from granting or denying benefits on the basis of sex. It follows, therefore, that the total 
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B. Equality as a Norm of .Preferred Conduct 
Equality not only alerts us to areas of potential moral and legal 
concern, Professor Chemerinsky says, it also tells us how to proceed 
once the areas are identified. It tells us, he says, that while equal 
treatment is presumptively good, unequal treatment is presumptively 
bad. It is a norm or "ideal" that "commands us to act to reduce or 
eliminate inequalities."57 To be sure, he says, it is not an uncondi-
tional requirement that all inequalities be eliminated, for some ine-
qualities may indeed be justified by external normative standards. 
Rather, it reminds us that our real "concern"58 is not with equality 
but with inequality; that while equal treatment itself does not matter, 
unequal treatment "does matter";59 that while equal treatment itself 
requires no justification, unequal treatment always requires justifica-
tion;60 that as between equal treatment and unequal treatment, there 
is a "presumption"61 in favor of equal treatment; that unlike those 
who wish to treat people equally, there is a ''burden of proof on 
those who wish to discriminate."62 
To illustrate, he hypothesizes a statute that creates two classes of 
students for the purpose of financial assistance: students with I. Q.s in 
excess of 120 who thereby become eligible for $1,000 in educational 
assistance; and students with I.Q.s of 120 or less who are eligible for 
only $100 in educational assistance. The statute distinguishes be-
tween the two classes of students and, in doing so, creates prescrip-
tive inequalities. It defines two classes of students as prescriptively 
unequal to one another for purposes of educational assistance, and, 
accordingly, it provides them with prescriptively unequal treatment. 
To that extent, he says, there is "something wrong"63 with the statute 
that would not be present if the statute provided either the same 
set of prescriptive rights a widower has under the statute-plus-the-fourteenth-amendment is a 
function of the presiding court's legal assessment as to what the legislature would have in-
tended if it had known that it had to proceed on a sexually neutral basis. See Califano v. 
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-93 (1979). If the court makes a legal judgment that the legislature 
intended in that event to grant benefits to widows and widowers alike, then denying them all 
benefits is not permissible under the law and, hence, is not treating them as "equals" as defined 
by the law. If, on the other hand, the court makes a legal judgment that the legislature in-
tended in that event to deny the benefits to widows and widowers alike, then granting them all 
benefits is not permissible under the law and, hence, is not treating them as "equals" as defined 
by the law. 
57. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 41-43. 
58. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 57-59. 
59. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 41-43. 
60. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 57-63. 
61. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 53-54. 
62. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 53-54. 
63. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 40-41. 
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amount of educational assistance for every student or no educational 
assistance for any student. What, then, is "wrong" with the hypo-
thetical statute that would be right in a statute that treated students 
equally? The answer, it seems, is obvious - the hypothetical statute 
treats students unequally. The inequality prescribed by the statute is 
itself a ''wrong" that we should "care about"64 and "want to 
eliminate."65 
The foregoing argument is premised on two distinct fallacies. 
First, in talking about a "presumption" in favor of treating people 
equally and about the ''wrong[ness]" of treating people unequally, 
the argument assumes that it is possible to treat people equally with-
out treating them unequally. But that is not so. Every prescriptive 
rule that classifies people on the basis of traits and activities neces-
sarily treats them unequally. Consider Professor Chemerinsky's hy-
pothetical education-funding statute. The statute distinguishes 
between students on the basis of 1.Q. and, thus, treats them un-
equally in that respect. If the distinction were removed and all stu-
dents were awarded $1,000 in educational assistance, the statute 
would still discriminate between students and nonstudents. If that 
discrimination were removed and all residents awarded $1,000, the 
statute would then discriminate between residents and nonresidents. 
If the residence discrimination were removed and $1,000 awarded to 
everyone who applied, the statute would-discriminate between those 
who applied and those who did not apply. If that discrimination in 
tum were removed and $1,000 awarded to anyone who could be lo-
cated, the statute would then discriminate between those who could 
be located and those who could not. If even that discrimination were 
removed, the statute would still discriminate between those who re-
ceive $1,000 under the statute and those who receive other benefits 
under other state statutes, for no statute can treat people equally with 
respect to both statutory and total entitlements. In short, the statute 
cannot be framed so as to treat people equally without also treating 
them unequally. 
It follows, therefore, that the so-called "presumption" of equality 
is unworkable by its own terms. It tells us to distinguish between 
rules that treat people equally and rules that treat people unequally, 
yet no such distinction exists. It tells us that there is something 
"wrong" with rules that treat people unequally, yet no rule can be 
found that does otherwise. It tells us that unequal treatment requires 
64. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 38-39. 
65. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 41-43. 
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justification and equal treatment does not, yet both properties are 
present in every rule. The answer, of course, may be that every rule 
requires justification.66 Or that no rule requires justification. But 
this much is certain: equality and inequality themselves cannot dis-
tinguish rules that require justification from rules that do not.67 
Second, and more serious still, the argument for equality and 
against inequality erroneously assumes that relationships of equality 
and inequality can be separated, prescriptively, from the prescriptive 
standards they presuppose. It assumes, that is, that the relationships 
of identity and nonidentity - of equality and inequality - that ob-
tain by reference to given prescriptive rules possesss moral value or 
disvalue in themselves apart from the rules from which they derive. 
Yet that cannot be true, because relationships of prescriptive equal-
ity and inequality have no content apart from the prescriptive stan-
dards that underlie them. Equality and inequality add nothing in 
the way of goodness or badness to the prescriptive standards that 
underlie them, because equality and inequality do nothing but spell 
out the logical relationships of identity and nonidentity that the stan-
dards themselves establish. If a prescriptive standard is morally and 
66. To say every rule (or any rule) requires justification again presupposes standards by 
which one can distinguish justified rules from unjustified rules. See generally Note, Legislative 
Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). Once one possesses such 
standards, however, those standards themselves - standards of substantive due process, as it 
were - provide the substance by which equalities and inequalities are determined. One can 
go on and call them standards of substantive "equality," but the reference to equality is en-
tirely derivative. It is simply a way of talking about, or referring to, one's various standards for 
justifying rules. 
The same is also true of the general proposition that all rules are invalid until shown to be 
valid. To say every rule requires justification is itself to posit a rule of substantive due process 
of the following kind - "no rule shall be deemed valid in respect of its several classifications 
until the classifications have each been justified." A rule of the latter kind may be desirable or 
not, but regardless of its desirability, the rule has no significant relationship to the concept of 
equality. One can call the latter rule a rule of "equality," but all one means is that classifica-
tions shall be deemed invalid until they are shown to be valid. Since the latter notion of 
equality derives entirely from one's anterior rule of substantive due process, one might as well 
pierce the superfluous language of equality and talk directly about tl).e underlying standard of 
substantive due process itself. 
67. For a further discussion of this point, see Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 537, 569-77 (1982). 
This is not to deny the possibility or exist,ance of a particular presumption of equality in a 
particular area of governance, Obviously, if a society believes that explicit discriminations 
between men and women are usually unjust or specially unjust, it can sensibly create a rebutta-
ble presumption against such discriminations. Similarly, if a society believes that its white 
majority's explicit discriminations against its black minorities are usually unjust or especially 
unjust, the society can create a rebuttable presumption against explicit majority discrimina-
tions of that kind. It is perfectly possible to create presumptions of equality of particular kinds, 
because it is perfectly possible to legislate equalities of particular kinds. The point is, rather, 
that it is not theoretically possible to create a general presumption of "equality" of all kinds, 
because it is not theoretically possible to legislate equality of all kinds; and it is not possible to 
create a presumption against majority discrimination against minorities of all kinds, because it 
is not theoretically possible to legislate without creating minorities. 
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legally just, the relationships of equality and inequality that ensue 
from it will be just; if a prescriptive standard is unjust, the equalities 
and inequalities that ensue from it will be unjust. 
This point can be illustrated by reference to descriptive equality. 
It makes no sense, as we have seen, to talk about the relative height 
of two persons without reference to descriptive standards for mea-
suring height. Basketball players who. are identical (and hence 
equal) as measured in feet or in inches may be nonidentical (and 
hence unequal) as measured in microns or angstroms. Their equal-
ity or inequality has no meaning apart from the consequences of 
subjecting them to a given standard of comparison. By the same 
token, the utility of the equality or inequality that results from a 
given standard has no meaning apart from the utility of the standard 
itself. If it is useful to measure objects in microns, it is useful to 
know that the objects are equal or unequal in microns, and useless to 
know that they are equal in inches. If it is useful to measure basket-
ball players in inches, it is useless to know they are unequal in 
microns. 
Much the same is true of prescriptive equality and inequality. It 
makes no sense to talk about prescriptive equality or inequality with-
out reference to a prescriptive standard of measure. People who are 
identical (and hence equal) by reference to rules governing ages of 
eligibility to drive automobiles may be nonidentical (and hence une-
qual) by reference to rules governing ages of eligibility to vote; peo-
ple who are equal by reference to rules governing eligibility to vote 
may be unequal by rules governing eligibilty to serve in the Senate 
or hold the office of President. The prescriptive equalities or ine-
qualities that obtain among them have no meaning apart from the 
consequences of subjecting them to given prescriptive standards of 
comparison. By the same token, the justness of the equalities and 
inequalities that result from given prescriptive standards has no 
meaning apart from the justness of the standards themselves. If it is 
just to prohibit people from driving until they are 16 years old, from 
voting until they are 18, and from serving in the Senate until they are 
30 years old, it follows that it is just to treat 18 and 35 year olds 
equally with respect to driving and voting, and unequally with re-
spect to serving in the Senate. If, on the other hand, it is unjust to 
allow 18-year-olds to drive or to prohibit 18-year-olds from serving 
in the Senate, it follows that it is unjust to treat 18- and 35-year-olds 
equally for purposes of driving and unequally for purposes of serv-
ing in the Senate. · 
In short, to say people are prescriptively equal or unequal is to 
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state the derivative consequence of comparing their respective treat-
ments under a given prescriptive rule of treatment. To say the rule is 
just means that the rule justly treats equally and unequally the peo-
ple whom the rule defines as being equal and unequal. To say the 
rule is unjust means that it unjustly treats equally and unequally the 
people whom the rule defines as equal and unequal. Thus, if it is 
just to give special educational support to students with high I.Q.s, 
then the equalities and inequalities that result from applying Profes-
sor Chemerinsky's hypothetical rule are themselves just. If it is un-
just to give special assistance to students with high I.Q.s, then the 
equalities and inequalities that result from applying the rule are 
themselves unjust. 
Why, then, does Professor Chemerinsky believe that relation-
ships of equality are in themselves good and relationships of ine-
quality in themselves bad? Because, again, he confuses general 
relationships of equality and inequality with the particular relation-
ship of equality that ensues from the particular prescriptive standard 
he has in mind. He believes, as most of us do, in the justness of the 
prescriptive standard - "no persons shall be stigmatized nor unrea-
sonably denied opportunities or benefits on the basis of race, sex, 
creed, or national origin." (He apparently also believes in the rule, 
"No person shall be denied educational opportunity on the basis of 
I.Q."). It logically follows, therefore, that he also believes in the jus-
tice of the relationships of equality among people that ensue from 
measuring them by the foregoing standard, and in the injustice of the 
inequalities among people that result from measuring them by rules 
that violate that standard. Unfortunately, being unaccustomed to 
piercing statements of equality and inequality for the prescriptive 
standards they logically presuppose, he mistakes the standards he 
finds just and unjust with the equalities and inequalities that derive 
from them. He believes that he likes equality and dislikes inequality, 
while in reality he likes particular prescriptive standards and the par-
ticular equalities they logically entail, and he dislikes other particu-
lar standards and the particular inequalities they logically entail. He 
does not really believe equality is just and inequality unjust. He be-
lieves particular equalities are just and particular inequalities are un-
just, and he does so because of his beliefs in the justice and injustice 
of the particular prescriptive standards that underlie them. 
C. Equality as a Moral and Legal Requirement of 
Consistency and Nonarhitrariness 
Equality, it is said, does more than alert us to rules that are po-
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tentially unjust, and more than charge us with the burden of justify-
ing those rules. It also tells us that certain justifications are simply 
unacceptable. It tells us, Professor Chemerinsky says, that prescrip-
tive rules shall be framed and applied consistently and impartially. 
It also tells us, Professor D' Amato says, that prescriptive rules shall 
be nonarbitrary in nature. 
I agree that consistency, impartiality, and nonarbitrariness are 
morally and legally desirable. I would deny, however, that those de-
sired qualitie~ derive from anterior notions of equality. If anything, 
the derivation is precisely the opposite: our notions of equality de-
rive from anterior prescriptive standards that themselves define what 
we mean by "consistency," "impartiality," and "nonarbitrariness." 
I. The Requirements of Consistency and Impartiality 
Equality, Professor Chemerinsky says, does something that rules 
by themselves cannot do: it tells us how rules should be adminis-
tered. It tells us that rules should be administered in a "consis-
tent,"68 "even-hande[d]"69 and "non-discriminatory"70 manner. 
This is so, he says, because no rule can completely determine or 
specify the standards for its administration. Every rule must "in-
evitab[ly]" accord some "discretion"71 to those charged with its ad-
ministration. Yet something tells us - something not contained in 
the rule itself - that the rule should be administered consistently 
and impartially. That something is the "concept of equality."72 
An example, he says, is the early equal protection case, Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins.13 The City of San Francisco in Yick Wo enacted an 
ordinance to prevent fire hazards by regulating the operation of 
laundries in nonbrick buildings. The ordinance made it an offense 
for any person to operate a laundry in a nonbrick building unless the 
Board of Supervisors in its discretion first granted him a permit. The 
Board of Supervisors exercised its discretion by granting permits to 
virtually every Caucasian applicant while denying permits to every 
Chinese applicant. The U.S. Supreme Court held that although the 
ordinance was valid on its face, it had been applied and adminis-
tered ''with an evil eye an[d] unequal hand," thereby creating illegal 
"discrimination between persons in similar circumstances" in viola-
68. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 26-27. 
69. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 27-29. 
70. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 26-27. 
71. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 27-29. 
72. Id 
73. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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tion of the fourteenth amendment requirement that justice be 
"equal."74 It is no acci4ent, Professor Chemerinsky says, that Yick 
Wo was decided in the name of equality, because the case involved 
an evil that no other principle reaches. The evil in the case did not 
lie in the terms of the ordinance and, hence, could not be addressed 
by reference to the ordinance. The evil lay in the inconsistent and 
partial way the ordinance was administered and, hence, could only 
be addressed in terms of the inequality of its administration. In his 
words: "[T]he concept of equality does add something to the en-
forcement of rules. Equality requires that the government apply its 
laws even-handedly. This concept is not part of any law, but rather 
is derived from the notion of equality."75 
Professor Chemerinsky is right to expect consistency and imparti-
ality in the administration of laws. He is wrong, however, to think 
they have their source in equality. Consistency and impartiality find 
their complete source in the content of the rules being administered. 
They are simply a spelling out of what the rules themselves mean. 
To say rules should be applied "consistently" and "impartially" 
means that they should be applied in accord with their terms. Con-
sistency and impartiality are not supplements to be added to rules; 
they are the result of giving rules the effect they have already been 
determined to possess. 
Take Yick Wo, for example. The city of San Francisco in Yick 
Wo could have dealt with the granting of permits in one of three 
ways: (i) by denying the Board of Supervisors any discretion at all to 
issue permits to operate laundries in nonbrick buildings; (ii) by 
granting the Board of Supervisors some discretion to issue permits 
while simultaneously prohibiting the Board from exercising its dis-
cretion on the basis ofrace; and (iii) by granting the Board discretion 
to issue permits without prohibiting the Board from exercising its dis-
cretion on the basis of race. Each of the foregoing rules entails its 
own standards of consistency and impartiality, but the standards de-
rive from the rules themselves, not from independent notions of 
equality. 
An ordinance containing no discretion. The San Francisco ordi-
nance could have been framed as an outright ban, thus denying the 
Board any discretion to issue permits to anyone to operate a laundry 
in a nonbrick building. If that were the case, the Board would be 
contradicting the ordinance if it issued permits to anyone, Caucasian 
74. 118 U.S. at 373-74. 
75. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 27-29. 
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or Chinese. The Board would be contradicting the ordinance be-
cause the Board would be saying that it had authority to grant some-
one a permit, while the ordinance says the Board has authority to 
grant no one a permit. The two statements of law contradict one 
another - and thus are "inconsistent" with one another - because 
they cannot logically be squared with one another. 
It follows, therefore, that under an outright ban on issuing per-
mits, only one course of conduct by the Board would be "consistent" 
with the ordinance - to deny permits to everyone. Then and only 
then, would the Board be acting consistently with the ordinance be-
cause then and only then, would its action be implicitly premised on 
a statement of law that squared with the ordinance. The scope of 
what is consistent and inconsistent with the ordinance thus turns en-
tirely on the scope of the ordinance. 
An ordinance containing discretion limited to nonracial considera-
tion. Alternatively, the San Francisco ordinance could have been 
framed as a grant of limited discretion, discretion confined to the 
granting and denying of permits on nonracial grounds. In that 
event, the Board would be subject to two legal standards and, hence, 
to two standards of consistency and impartiality. Within the area of 
its discretion to grant and deny permits, the Board would be subject 
to a standard of plenary rulemaking authority. For that is what "dis-
cretion" means. It means an area within which the discretion-holder 
has authority to adopt, or not to adopt, whatever rule he deems fit.76 
It is an area in which his action cannot legally contradict any other 
norm because, by definition, it is an area in which no constraining 
norms exist. Within the area of its discretion, therefore, the Board 
would be logically incapable of doing anything that would be legally 
inconsistent with the ordinance. 
With respect to the limitation on its discretion, however, the situ-
ation is precisely the opposite. The limitation prescribes what the 
board must do (ie., exercise its discretion on a nonracial basis) and 
not do (ie., exercise its discretion on a racial basis). If the Board 
acted on a nonracial basis, its action would square with the limita-
tion and thus be legally "consistent" with it. If the Board acted on a 
racial basis, its action would contradict the limitation and thus be 
legally "inconsistent" with it. Again the scope of consistency and 
inconsistency coincides with the scope of the rules being 
administered. 
16. See Greenawalt, .Discretion and Judicial .Decision: The Elusive Quest far the Fellers that 
Bind Judges, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975). 
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The same analysis applies to "impartiality." If the Board com-
plied with the ordinance by granting and denying permits on a non-
racial basis, it would be acting "impartially" within the meaning of 
the ordinance because it would not be actingpartially toward per-
sons whom the ordinance prohibits the Board from treating with 
partiality. If, on the other hand, the Board granted permits only to 
Chinese, it would be acting "partially" because it would be showing 
partiality toward persons whom the ordinance prohibits the Board 
from treating with partiality. Like the requirement of "consistency," 
the requirement that rules be applied "impartially" logically col-
lapses into the simpler requirement that rules be applied in accord 
with their terms. 77 
An ordinance containing discretion encompassing racial considera-
tion. Finally, the San Francisco ordinance might have been framed 
as the courts in Yick Wo construed it to be framed - as an ordi-
nance granting absolute discretion to the Board to grant or deny per-
mits on any basis including a racial basis.78 In that event, no action 
by the Board in granting or denying permits could be legally incon-
sistent under the ordinance, because the ordinance would contain 
nothing for the action to be inconsistent with. The Board could le-
gally grant permits to Caucasians qua Caucasians. Or it could le-
gally deny permits to Chinese qua Chinese. Or it could grant 
permits exclusively to Causcasians for the :first 364 days of the year 
and exclusively to Chinese on the 365th day of the year. No such 
actions or combination of actions could be legally inconsistent under 
the ordinance because none of them contradicts anything the ordi-
nance requires the Board to do. 
This does not mean that discretionary acts may not be inconsis-
tent by nonlegal standards. Of course they may. They may be in-
consistent by descriptive standards of all sorts. Thus, if a board of 
supervisors grants permits exclusively to Caucasians for 364 days a 
77. In certain cases, indeed, the resemblances and differences between human beings 
which are relevant for the criticism of legal arrangements as just or unjust are quite obvi-
ous. This is preeminently the case when we are concerned not with the justice or injustice 
of the law but of its application in particular cases. For here the relevant resemblances 
and differences between individuals to which the person who administers the law must 
attend, are determined by the law itself. To say that the law against murder is justly 
applied is to say that it is impartially applied to all those and only those who are alike in 
having done what the law forbids. . . . 
The connexion between this aspect of justice and the very notion of proceeding by rule 
is obviously very close. Indeed, it might be said that to apply a law justly to different cases 
is simply to take seriously the assertion that what is to be applied m different cases is the 
same general rule. 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 156-57 (1961). 
78. See 118 U.S. at 366-68. 
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year and then exclusively to Chinese on the 365th day, one can say 
that the standard describing the last day's action (i.e., the descriptive 
standard of granting permits solely to Chinese) differs from and thus 
is "inconsistent" with the standard describing the previous year's ac-
tion (i.e., the descriptive standard of granting permits solely to Cau-
casians). The point is, however, that the descriptive inconsistency is 
prescriptively irrelevant unless it can be shown that the board has a 
prescriptive obligation to adhere to one descriptive standard or the 
other. If the board has discretion to grant and deny permits on a 
racial basis, its action on the 365th day, though descriptively incon-
sistent, is not legally inconsistent, because it does not conflict with 
anything the Board is legally obliged to do. The issue is rather like a 
girl who insists on dating a fair-haired boy after dating five dark-
haired boys in a row. Her dating the fair-haired boy may be descrip-
tively inconsistent with her prior behavior (and it may show "partial-
ity" to fair-haired boys), but it is not morally inconsistent or partial, 
because she has no moral obligation to date dark-haired boys. Simi-
larly, unless the Board's practice of granting permits only to Cauca-
sians operates to create an informal "whites-only" rule from which it 
may not depart, the board's decision to grant a Chinese a permit on 
the 365th day cannot legally be regarded as inconsistent or partial.79 
What, then, does this mean for Yick Wo? How does it bear on 
the argument that the Court decided Yick Wo on principles of "con-
sistency" and "impartiality" having their source in equality? It 
means, I believe, that if the Court decided Yick Wo correctly, it was 
not because the Board's preference for Caucasians violated abstract 
79. Although it is said to be a principle of federal administrative law that the federal courts 
will require federal administrative agencies to comply with their own rules, see W. GELLHORN, 
C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 395-98 (7th ed. 1979), it has never been thought 
to be a principle of federal constitutional law that the federal courts will require states to abide 
by state law. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (the states are final in 
stating the content of their own law). But cf. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980) (revers-
ing a state court judgment for failure on the state court's behalf to give a criminal defendant 
the benefit of what the U.S. Supreme Court perceived to be the real content of state law). It is 
no accident that there is so little federal constitutional precedent for the proposition that fed-
eral courts have an obligation to compel state courts to abide by state law, because every 
alleged failure of a state court to comply with its own law can, conceptually, be described with 
equal validity as a redefinition by the state court of what its own law really is. Thus, consider a 
board that grants permits solely to Caucasians for 364 days a year and then solely to Chinese 
on the 365th day of the year. The practice can be described in two ways. One can say that the 
state's "real" rule is to grant permits solely to Caucasians, and that its decision to grant permits 
to Chinese on the 365th day is an unexplained and unprincipled "exception" to the rule. Alter-
natively, and with equal plausibility, one can say that the state rule is precisely what the board 
did - that is, to grant Caucasians permits for 364 days a year and Chinese permits on the 
365th day. Unless the federal court possesses some standard by which it can presume to 
"know" the board's real rule better than the board itself, it has no principled basis on which to 
say that the board's practice violates the board's own rule. 
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notions of consistency, impartiality, or equality, but because the 
Board's preference violated a particular substantive standard the 
Board was legally obliged to follow. The Board's action did not vio-
late the ordinance itself, because the ordinance itself did not pre-
clude the Board from granting permits on a racial basis. The 
Board's action did violate the fourteenth amendment, however, be-
cause the fourteenth amendment does prohibit state agencies from 
granting or denying benefits on racially stigmatic grounds. Once the 
fourteenth amendment standard is ascertained, the Board's action 
can be characterized in several ways. One can say that the Board 
violated Yick Wo's fourteenth amendment right not to be denied a 
benefit on racially stigmatic grounds. Or one can say that the 
Board's action was "inconsistent" with its legal obligations under the 
fourteenth amendment; or that the Board treated "partially" people 
whom the fourteenth amendment required it to treat "impartially"; 
or that the Board treated as nonidentical (and hence unequal) in a 
certain respect people whom the fourteenth amendment prescribes to 
be identical (and hence equal) in that respect. The latter statements 
of "inconsistency," "partiality," and "equality" are doubtless true. 
But they do not add anything to what the first statement already 
contains. They are nothing but derivative restatements of what the 
fourteenth amendment has already been ascertained to mean. 80 
80. The U.S. Supreme Court has held per Justice Stevens that the Equal Protection Clause 
codifies a "fundamental principle" to the effect that "the State must govern impartially." New 
York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (per Stevens, J.). See also Rogers v. 
Lodge, 50 U.S.L.W. 5041, 5049 (U.S. July l, 1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("the requirement 
of impartial administration of the law that is embodied in the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment"); Clements v. Fashing, 50 U.S.L.W. 4869, 4874 n.5 (U.S. June 25, 
1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("the Equal Protection Clause has independent significance in 
protecting the federal interest in requiring States to govern impartially"); Western & Southern 
Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 677-78 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Justice Stevens is either right or wrong, depending on what he means by "impartiality." If 
Justice Stevens means that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the state from showing parti-
ality toward those specific persons toward whom the Equal Protection Clause specifically pro-
hibits the state from showing partiality (e.g., toward whites on the premise of their being a 
superior and favored race), he is obviously - and tautologically - right. Like every norma-
tive rule, the Equal Protection Clause defines what must and must not be done to various 
people and, hence, defines the various people toward whom partiality in that respect must and 
must not be shown. In that sense, however, the Equal Protection Clause has no more to say 
about partiality and impartiality than any other rule. It says something about specific kinds of 
impartiality to specific classes of people, but it says nothing about impartiality itself. If, on the 
other hand, Justice Stevens means that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the state from 
showing partiality toward anyone by any standard (e.g., toward persons in desparate financial 
need), he is obviously wrong. Every normative rule classifies people and, hence, defines classes 
of people toward whom partiality is owed. It is incoherent to say that the state may not show 
partiality toward anyone by any standard,just as it is incoherent to say that the state must not 
treat people unequally by any moral standard. To treat two people equally (or impartially) in 
one respect will always be to treat them unequally (or impartially) in other respects. See Note, 
Developments in the Law- Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1164 (1969). In short, 
insofar as it means anything at all, the statement that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the 
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2. The Requirement of Nonarbitrariness. 
Professor D' Amato, too, believes that equality is an independent 
norm with moral and legal content all its own. Equality comes into 
play, he says, in areas in which prescriptive rules have no further 
function to perform. Prescriptive rules can declare it to be wrong to 
impose certain burdens on any groups of people (say, the burdens of 
cruel and unusual punishment), and wrong to impose any burdens 
on certain groups of people (say, groups believed to be racially infe-
rior), and wrong to impose any burden on any group of people for 
certain reasons (say, for no legitimate ends). But within the parame-
ters of what prescriptive rules consider lawful, rules have nothing 
further to say about how people are classified. They have nothing to 
say, for example, about the lawfulness of arbitrarily discriminating 
among persons who are otherwise similarly situated. It is equality 
alone, he says, that tells us it is unlawful to distinguish among people 
on arbitrary or random grounds. 
To illustrate, Professor D' Amato asks us to imagine a state that 
endeavors to reduce gasoline consumption by restricting opportuni-
ties of drivers to purchase gasoline. Instead of spreading the restric-
tion evenly among all drivers by means of rationing, however, the 
state arbitrarily selects a random group of drivers for a particularly 
onerous restriction: it permits drivers with odd-numbered license 
plates to purchase gasoline every day of the week, but restricts driv-
ers with even-numbered license plates to purchasing gas solely on 
Saturdays. There is something offensive about such a statute, Profes-
sor D' Amato says, but its offensiveness has nothing to do with pre-
vailing prescriptive rules. The statute does not abridge anyone's 
fundamental rights, because the right to purchase gasoline is not fun-
damental. The statute does not impose special burdens on any sus-
pect class, because even-numbered drivers are not a suspect class. 
The statute does not violate standards of rationality, because the re-
state from treating people partially collapses logically into the simpler statement that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits the state from denying persons the treatment to which the Equal 
Protection Clause entitles them. Cf. Gillespie, On Treating Like Cases Differently, 25 PHIL, Q, 
151, 157 (1975) (the statement that the state must treat people "consistently" collapses logically 
into the simpler statement that the state must give people the treatment to which they are 
entitled). 
It might be argued, of course, that while the Equal Protection Clause has specific content, 
its specific content is to require the states to apply their laws faithfully to the persons to whom 
their laws apply - and that that is what "impartiality" under the Equal Protection Clause 
means. The trouble with the latter principle is not that it is wrong as a matter of constitutional 
law, but that it is impotent. For any state, when challenged, can always say that what it has 
done is its law. See note 79 Sllpra. Consequently, unless the federal courts possess some stan-
dard by which they can know the content of state law better than the states do themselves, the 
Equal Protection Clause will end up ratifying whatever the states choose to do. 
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striction is rationally related to the legitimate end of reducing gaso-
line consumption. Rather, the evil of the statute is that it arbitrarily 
and randomly treats dissimilarly people who are similarly situated. 
The evil of the statute is not that it violates people's rights, but that it 
treats them unequally. 
Professor D' Amato's argument fails, I believe, as a simple matter 
oflogic. He endeavors to disjoin two things that by definition cannot 
be separated. He seeks to disjoin a particular statement of prescrip-
tive equality from the particular prescriptive standard it logically 
presupposes. He cannot do so. Either he is right that odd- and even-
numbered drivers are prescriptively equal under the Constitution, in 
which case the gasoline-conservation statute necessarily violates 
some constitutional right of even-numbered drivers that is logically 
anterior to assertions of their equality. Or he is right that the statute 
does not violate any such constitutional right of even-numbered 
drivers, in which case odd- and even-numbered drivers are not pre-
scriptively equal under the Constitution. But as a matter of logic, he 
cannot be right that the statute treats unequally people who are pre-
scriptively equal under the Constitution and, yet, violates no pre-
scriptive right anterior to the determination of equality. 
The fallacy in Professor D'Amato's argument can be revealed in 
alternative ways: Starting with his assumption that the gasoline-con-
servation statute treats unequally people who are prescriptively 
equal under the Constitution, one can show that the statute must also 
violate constitutional rights that obtain independently of equality; 
alternatively, starting with his assumption that the statute does not 
violate independent constitutional rights, one can show that the stat-
ute cannot treat unequally people who are prescriptively equal under 
the Constitution. Let us proceed on the former premise - that the 
statute treats unequally people for whom the Constitution requires 
equal treatment. To say odd-numbered drivers are constitutionally 
equal to even-numbered drivers for purposes of purchasing gasoline 
presupposes a constitutional standard of comparison, a standard by 
which the two groups of drivers are rendered identical for purposes 
of purchasing gasoline. What can the standard be in this case? It 
cannot be a descriptive standard, such as a standard that describes 
people by reference to whether or not they drive automobiles, be-
cause as Professor D' Amato himself recognizes, one cannot move 
from the descriptive premise that all drivers are descriptively identi-
cal in being drivers to the prescriptive conclusion that all drivers are 
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prescriptively identical in their right to purchase gasoline. 81 To say 
drivers are prescriptively equal in some respect presupposes a pre-
scriptive standard by which they are identical. 
What, then, is the prescriptive standard or rule that Professor 
D' Amato's assertion of equality presupposes? It cannot be that all 
drivers have a constitutional right to purchase gasoline, because, as 
Professor D'Amato says, they clearly do not. Nor can it be that 
even-numbered drivers are a constitutionally suspect class against 
whom the state may not discriminate, because, as he says, the state 
may discriminate between even- and odd-numbered drivers for pur-
poses of coordinating gasoline purchases.82 Nor can it be that the 
state may not impose burdens on persons for illegitimate ends, be-
cause though such a rule may exist, the gasoline conservation statute 
does not violate it. None of the foregoing standards explains Profes-
sor D' Amato's assertion that the odd- and even-numbered drivers 
are prescriptively identical for purposes of gasoline conservation. 
Yet some such prescriptive standard must exist because his assertion 
of prescriptive equality presupposes it. 
To ascertain the standard, it may help to inquire why the gaso-
line-conservation statute seems unjust to Professor D' Amato. Why 
does Professor D' Amato consider it wrong to impose an onerous 
burden on a class of randomly selected drivers? The answer, I sus-
pect, is that he believes the statute imposes an onerous burden on a 
narrow class of drivers under circumstances in which the state could 
fully achieve its ends by imposing a less onerous burden on that or a 
different class of drivers. Instead of imposing the Saturdays-only re-
striction on the class of even-numbered drivers for the entire year, 
the state could impose the Saturdays-only restriction on the class of 
all drivers - alternating the restriction as between even- and odd-
numbered drivers on a month-by-month basis. An alternating 
scheme serves the state's ends just as well, because it imposes the 
very same quantitative restriction on the very same number of driv-
ers every month, ie, a Saturdays-only restriction on one half of all 
drivers every month. Yet by spreading the burden of the Saturdays-
only restriction among the wider class of all drivers, the scheme les-
sens the overall burden. 83 
81. See D'Amato, Comment: Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea, 81 MICH, L. REV, 600 
(1983) (suggesting that state legislators, albeit drivers themselves, may well be justified in cre-
ating a prescriptive standard by which they are excepted from the rationing scheme), 
82. See D'Amato, supra note 81 at 600. 
83. The spreading of the burden may lessen the burden in the same way that spreading the 
burdens of tort losses lessens their magnitude. A $50,000 personal injury from an industrial 
accident can be distributed in different ways: by imposing the entire loss on the injured em-
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This suggests that Professor D' Amato implicitly adheres to some-
thing like the following rule of substantive due process: "The state 
shall not pursue its ends by imposing a great burden on one class of 
persons where it could fully achieve its ends by imposing a consider-
ably lesser burden on that or another class of persons."84 The fore-
going rule explains why Professor D' Amato believes that odd- and 
ployee; by spreading the loss among all employees (say, at $1/per employee); or by spreading 
the loss among all purchasers of the employer's product (say, at $0.10/purchaser). If one 
measures the burden of the distribution solely by the total number of dollars directly lost by 
the total number of persons, the several distributions are equally burdensome. If, however, 
one measures the burden of the distribution by its overall impact, the latter distributions are 
less burdensome, because employees and purchasers as a whole are better able to absorb loss. 
The same is true of distributing the Saturdays-only restriction. If one measures the "burden" 
of the restriciton solely by the total number of persons subjected to Saturdays-only purchases 
per year, it makes no difference whether one imposes the restriction solely on even-numbered 
drivers or whether one spreads the restriciton among all drivers. If, however, one measures the 
burden of the restriction by its overall impact, the latter formula may lessen the overall magni-
tude of the burden by spreading it among a class that is better able to absorb it. 
Professor D'Amato responds by arguing that while we may be able to minimize the burden 
by spreading it among a wider class, we cannot take the step of defining the latter class without 
reference to anterior notions of equality. I would disagree. The truth is precisely the opposite. 
We cannot know which drivers are "equal" for purposes of spreading the burden until we first 
define the class to be regulated; and we cannot define the class to be regulated until we first 
discover the optimum group within which we achieve our desired ends at the lowest overall 
cost. We may ultimately discover that the optimum class includes all drivers - in which case 
we can say that all drivers are equal. Or we may ultimately discover that the optimum class 
includes all drivers except legislators, policemen, and doctors - in which case we can say that 
all drivers are equal except legislators, policemen and doctors. In both cases, however, it is the 
content of our normative rule that establishes the relevant equalities and inequalities, not vice 
versa. 
84. The foregoing constitutional rule finds some support in the recent equal protection 
case, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1982). Zimmerman 
involved the constitutionality of a state statute that conditioned causes of action for discrimi-
nation against the handicapped on the willingness of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices 
Commission to conduct a hearing within 120 days of the filing of a complaint of discrimina-
tion. The plaintiff, Logan, whose cause of action was barred by the failure of the commission 
to convene a hearing within 120 days of his filing of the action, argued that the statute de-
prived him of equal protection by treating him differently from persons whose actions were 
scheduled for a hearing within the 120-day period. The respondent, Zimmerman, argued that 
the statute did not violate equal protection because it served a rational end - that is, it served 
to expedite the resolution of certain claims. A plurality of the Court held that though the end 
of expediting the resolution of claims was legitimate, and though the means employed fur-
thered the latter end, the statute was nevertheless unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause because it imposed a great burden on a randomly selected class under circumstances in 
which the desired end could have been achieved by imposing a considerably lesser burden on 
a different class. See Zimmerman, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4252-53 & n.3 (opinion of Blackmun, J., 
concurring). See also Zimmerman, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4253 (opinion of Powell, J., concurring). 
This is not to say that a sharp distinction can ever be drawn, conceptually, between ends 
and means. To say that the Zimmerman statute used illicit means to achieve a legitimate end 
can be taken to mean that while the statute furthered some legitimate ends, it violated still 
other legitimate ends and, thus, was not rationally related to the aggregate of legitimate ends 
that the statute reportedly served. The Supreme Court decision in Zimmerman can thus be 
taken to mean that although the Zimmerman statute served the state's end of expediting the 
resolution of claims, the statute did not rationally serve the state's companion end of resolving 
such claims 011 the merits. Stating the holding in that way illustrates the logical necessity in all 
rationality analysis of attributing ends to the state. See note 79 supra, and note 85 infra. 
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even-numbered drivers are prescriptively equal. It explains why the 
drivers, though nonidentical and thus unequal under the statute, are 
nevertheless equal and entitled to be treated equally under the Con-
stitution. The argument goes as follows: 
(i) Major premise: The state shall not pursue its ends by impos-
ing a great burden on one class of persons where it can fully achieve 
its ends by imposing a considerably lesser burden on that or a differ-
ent class of persons. 
(ii) Minor premise: The state, instead of imposing a Saturdays-
only restriction on even-numbered drivers for the entire year, could 
have fully achieved its goals by means of the considerably lesser bur-
den of alternating the restriction between odd- and even-numbered 
drivers on a month-by-month basis.85 
(iii) Conclusion: Since the state could have achieved its goal of 
gasoline conservation by less burdensome means, and since the Con-
stitution requires the state to achieve its ends by such less burden-
some means, it follows that the gasoline-conservation statute divided 
into subclasses (f.e, the subclasses of even- and odd-numbered driv-
ers) persons whom the Constitution requires the state to treat as a 
single class for purposes of the state's ends (f.e., a class of all drivers). 
Prescriptively, the keystone of the argument is step (i), a pro-
posed standard of substantive due process limiting the exercise of 
state power. As a constitutional limit on the way the state may exer-
cise regulatory power, the standard limits the way states may classify 
people for regulatory purposes and, hence, the extent to which peo-
ple may be treated as equals or unequals for regulatory purposes. 
The standard determines that odd- and even-numbered drivers must 
be classified together for purposes of the Saturdays-only regulation 
because classifying them separately would subject even-numbered 
drivers to an unnecessary "burden" within the meaning of the stan-
85. Every state statute can be plausibly described as the sole means at the state's disposal 
for achieving the state's goals - simply by taking the actual content of the state statute as the 
complete embodiment itself of the state's real goals. See l:'lote, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, 
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE LJ. 123, 128 (1972) ("It is always possible to define the legisla-
tive purpose of a statute in such a way that the statutory classificati9n is rationally related to 
it"). Therefore, to say that a state could "fully achieve" its goals by means of some statute 
other than the statute at hand necessarily presupposes a standard or set of standards for defin-
ing the state's "real" goals - whether the standard be the state's own statement of its goals, or 
a standard defining what the state will be permitted to take as its goals. See Westen, supra 
note 67, at 569 n.117, 577 n.136. With respect to the gasoline-consumption statute, therefore, I 
am assuming that the state's "real" goal is to conserve the consumption of gasoline at no 
administrative cost higher than the one entailed by the statute it actually adopted. Given that 
statement of goals, it follows, I think, that a substitute statute that alternates the rationing 
between even- and odd-numbered drivers would fully achieve the state's goals as well as the 
statute at hand. 
January 1983] The Meaning of Equality 651 
dard. It is the latter constitutional standard, therefore, that renders 
odd- and even-numbered drivers constitutionally "equal" for the 
state's gasoline conservation statute. The constitutional standard 
does not require that the two classes of drivers be classified together 
because they are, somehow, already constitutionally "equal" for reg-
ulatory purposes; rather, they are constitutionally equal for regula-
tory purposes because the prevailing constitutional standard requires 
that they be classified together. 
I do not mean to take a position here on whether the state 
actually has a constitutional obligation to replace a greater burden 
on a certain class with a considerably lesser burden on that or a dif-
ferent class whenever it can achieve its ends as well by both means. 
Nor do I take a position on whether, if the state has such an obliga-
tion, the state would be precluded from adopting a gasoline-conser-
vation statute of the kind Professor D' Amato describes. A state may 
be able to show, for example, that alternating the Saturdays-only re-
striction from month to month between the two classes of drivers is 
too complicated, inefficient, or susceptible to abuse to be justified 
under the circumstances. The state may be able to show that - as 
with drafting men into the military service by lot, or auditing in-
come-tax returns at random - the state has no adequate alternative 
to imposing a year-long burden on a narrow class of randomly se-
lected drivers. In that event, the class of even-numbered drivers 
would not be constitutionally equal to odd-numbered drivers for 
purposes of the gasoline conservation statute, any more than young 
men whose names are selected by lot are constitutionally equal to 
men whose names are passed over by lot for purposes of compulsory 
military service. The point is, !f odd- and even-numbered drivers are 
prescriptively equal under the Constitution, as Professor D' Amato 
says they are, it must be by virtue of some constitutional rule of the 
foregoing kind - that is, some rule of substantive due process that 
itself determines who is equal and who is unequal within the mean-
ing of the Constitution. 86 
86. Others may be able to propose alternative rules of substantive due process that produce 
essentially the same results. Someone with a view of substantive due process based on "reci-
procity," for example, might argue that persons who reap the benefits of a resource should 
presumptively be obliged to bear the accompanying burdens and, thus, that persons who reap 
the benefit of purchasing gasoline should presumptively be obliged to bear the burdens of 
conserving it. Alternatively, someone with "economic " views might argue that due proces 
constitutionalizes the combination of two economic rules: (i) the costs of every enterprise 
ought to be internalized within the enterprise; and (ii) the costs of every enterprise ought to be 
spread as widely as possible among all users of the enterprise. The constitutional consequence 
of such rules would be to require all drivers, and only drivers, to bear the costs of gasoline 
conservation. In that event, the descriptive standard of "all motorists" would coincidentally 
coincide with the governing prescriptive standard. 
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Ill. THE CONFUSIONS OF EQUALITY 
Professor Chemerinsky denies that equality is confusing. More 
than that, he argues that equality is "rhetorically useful" in moral 
and legal discourse because "it helps us to persuade people to accept 
[results] that we believe [are] justified" ap.d thus "causes people to 
protect rights that they otherwise would ignore." I think that Profes-
sor Chemerinsky is wrong about the confusions of equality, but 
wrong in a rather different way than he is wrong about the emptiness 
of equality. He can be proved wrong about the emptiness of equality 
in the same way that "2 + 2 = 3" can be proved wrong - by show-
ing that his statements about equality contradict the meaning of their 
constituent terms. A persons who says 2 + 2 = 3 simply does not 
know what the terms "2" and "3" mean. A person who denies that 
equality is empty does not know what equality means. The same 
cannot be said of a person who denies that equality is confusing. 
That equality is confusing cannot be proved in the same way that "2 
+ 2 = 4" can be proved, because it is not a tautological truth. As 
with most moral and legal issues, one can do no more than show that 
the arguments in its favor predominate over the arguments against it. 
One can do no more than explain how and why the confusion oc-
curs, offer examples of common confusion, and leave it to the reader 
to assess persuasiveness. 
A. The Nature of the Confusion 
Professor Chemerinsky understands me to be arguing that equal-
ity is "inherent[ly]"87 confusing - that equality has conceptual 
properties that "inevitably"88 and "invariably"89 lead people into 
confusion. Framing the issue in those terms, he seeks to demonstrate 
that equality is not inherently confusing. 
I am afraid Professor Chemerinsky misunderstands my position. 
I do not believe - and do not believe I have said - that equality is 
inherently confusing.90 Indeed, given its logic, equality cannot be 
inherently confusing. Equality and inequality are derivative rela-
tionships of identity and nonidentity that obtain among persons or 
things by reference to given standards of measure. They add noth-
87. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 69-71. 
88. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 79-80. 
89. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 85-86. 
90. I thought I had made it clear that there is nothing in the concept of equality that 
precludes a person from reasoning clearly, provided he maintains his diligence. The problem 
with equality is not that it precludes clear thinking, but that it encourages unclear thinking. 
See Westen, supra note 67, at 581, 586-87, 592. 
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ing to what one inevitably knows by virtue of having subjected per-
sons or things to given standards of comparison. They are 
"empty,"91 "formal,"92 "vacuous,"93 "consequential"94 relationships 
with no independent content of their own. As long as a person un-
derstands them for what they are - as long as he pierces them for 
the standards of measure they logically incorporate by reference -
he not only will not be confused, he logically cannot be confused. 
That equality does not inevitably confuse, however, does not pre-
vent it from typically confusing. Equality tends to confuse people 
often and to confuse them badly. Indeed, that it confuses people is 
one of the first things commentators observe about equality. Equal-
ity, they say, is a "strange and difficult"95 idea, a "complex,"96 "intri-
cate,"97 "elusive,"98 and "mysterious"99 concept that "distorts" and 
"obscures"100 normative discourse, transforming it into a "bottom-
less pit of complexities."101 
To understand why equality is such a "confused word,"102 it 
helps to understand how the confusion occurs. The confusions of 
equality are many, but they can almost all be traced to a common 
source: statements of equality presuppose underlying standards of 
comparison; but by expressing their underlying standards elliptically 
rather than directly, such statements tend to mask and conceal the 
actual normative standards they incorporate by reference. As a con-
sequence, people fall into confusions of several kinds: B may make 
a statement of equality that A rejects, but only because B and A are 
implicitly proceeding on the basis of different standards of compari-
son. B may make a statement of equality that A accepts, but, again, 
only because B and A are implicitly proceeding by reference to dif-
91. J. HARRISON, HUME'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 197 (1981). See also Westen,supra note 67, 
at 578 n.140. 
92. J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 100 (1973); C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 
AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 11-29 (1963); Locke, The Trivializability ef Universal-
izability, 77 PHIL. REV. 25 (1968). 
93. J. REES, EQUALITY 95-96 (1971); Wollheim, Equality and the Equal Rights, in JUSTICE 
AND SOCIAL POLICY Ill, 116 (F. Olafson ed. 1961). 
94. Browne, Nonegalitarian Justice, 56 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 48, 52 (1978). 
95. Adler & Hutchins, The Idea ef Equality, in THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY 303 (M. Adler & 
R. Hutchins eds. 1968). 
96. Blackstone, Introduction, in THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY v (W. Blackstone ed. 1969). 
97. Dallrnayr, Functionalism, Justice and Equality, 78 ETHICS l, 10 (1967). 
98. Evans, Equality, Ambiguity and Public Choice, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1385 (1981). 
99. Dworkin, Whal is Equality? 10 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 185 (1981). 
100. Browne, supra note 94, at 53. 
101. Sowell, We're Not Really Equal, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 7, 1981, at 13. 
102. Id. 
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f erent standards of comparison. B may conclude that persons who 
are equal by a particular descriptive standard must therefore be 
treated as equals by a particular prescriptive standard, but only be-
cause he overlooks his having substituted one sort of standard for the 
other. A may conclude that persons who are equal by one prescrip-
tive standard must therefore be treated as. equal by another prescrip-
tive standard, but, again, only because he overlooks his having 
substituted one prescriptive standard for the other. B may express in 
terms of equality a particular prescriptive standard he cherishes and 
thereby come to believe that it is equality itself he holds dear. A may 
express in terms of inequality the violation of a particular prescrip-
tive standard he cherishes and thereby come to believe that it is ine-
quality itself he reviles. 
This tendency of equality to confuse can be illustrated by consid-
ering areas in which equality does not confuse. Equality is 
noticeably unconfusing in mathematics and science, because people 
discussing equivalences in math and science are likely to be quite 
clear about their standards of measure. Take math for example. 
Equality is "an easily understood concept in mathematics" 103 be-
cause the standard that governs equivalences and nonequivalences 
in math can scarcely be misunderstood. The standard is prescribed 
by a convention that everyone who does math understands: integers 
or symbols on the left side of an equation are "equal" to integers on 
the right side if they are identical to one another by number; integers 
on the left side are "unequal" to integers on the right side if they are 
nonidentical by number. The standard of comparison for determin-
ing identity and nonidentity - equivalence and nonequivalence -
is the standard of number. The same kind of clarity exists in the 
sciences. People who invoke equivalences and nonequivalences in 
science are unlikely to be misled regarding the underlying standards 
of measure. This does not mean that equality and inequality have 
greater content in technical discourse than elsewhere. They do not. 
They are just as derivative (and thus as empty) in math and science 
as elsewhere. It means, rather, that while equality and inequality 
remain empty in technical discourse, they do not confuse and, be-
cause they do not confu~e, they do not warrant being banished from 
technical discourse. 
Unfortunately, experience with equality and inequality in law 
and morals suggests the opposite. People who invoke equivalences 
and nonequivalences in law and morals tend to mislead (and be mis-
103. Id 
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led) regarding underlying standards of measure. Take the question 
of whether separate-but-equal educational facilities are "equal" for 
fourteenth amendment purposes. The Supreme Court in P!essy v. 
Ferguson104 held that separate but equal facilities for blacks and 
whites are equal for constitutional purposes; the Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education105 held that separate but equal educational facil-
ities for blacks and whites are "inherently unequal." 106 A similar 
question is being debated today regarding educational facilities for 
men and women. Some authorities argue that separate but equal 
colleges for men and women are equal for fourteenth amendment 
purposes; others argue that they are inherently unequal.107 It should 
be obvious, however, that stating the issue as one of equality or ine-
quality asks the wrong question and, consequently, tends to beget the 
wrong answer. Separate but equal educational facilities are not 
either equal or unequal, they are both equal and unequal. They are 
prescriptively equal by some prescriptive standards, and prescrip-
tively unequal by other prescriptive standards: equal by a prescrip-
tive rule that prohibits the state from spending less money to educate 
blacks than to educate whites ( or less money to educate women than 
to educate men); unequal by a prescriptive rule that prohibits the 
state from stigmatizing persons or denying them educational oppor-
tunities on the basis of race or sex. Thus, the real question today is 
not whether separate but equal colleges or athletic facilities for men 
and women are equal for fourteenth amendment purposes, but what 
standard or rule the fourteenth amendment prescribes - a rule that 
prohibits the state from spending less on the training of women than 
on the training of men, a rule that prohibits the state from stigma-
tizing women on the basis of sex, or a rule that prohibits the state 
from offering educational and athletic opportunities on the basis of 
sex? The latter question cannot be avoided, because it provides the 
prescriptive standard by which constitutional equality and inequality 
are to be measured. Yet by stating the question derivatively in terms 
of equality rather than directly in terms of the underlying standard, 
104. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
106. 347 U.S. at 495. 
107. Compare Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976) (upholding all-
male and all-female high schools of "equal quality and prestige"), ajf d. per curiam by an 
equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977), with Yellow Springs Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High 
School Athletic Assn., 647 F.2d 651, 666-97 & n.8 (6th Cir. 1981) (Jones, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (denying female chance to compete on best team creates stigma). Cf. Mississippi 
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 50 U.S.L.W. 5068, 5069 n.l (U.S. July 1, 1982) (reserving for a 
future time the question whether "separate but equal" educational facilities for males and 
females violate the Constitution). 
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one "obscures"108 the underlying choice of standards and thus "dis-
torts" 109 moral and legal discourse. 
Equality and inequality are more confusing in law and morals 
than in math and science, not because equality and inequality mean 
anything different in one area than in the other, but because the stan-
dards by which equivalences and nonequivalences are measured are 
more elusive in law and morals. The descriptive standards that pop-
ulate math and science tend to be clear, certain, and settled. The 
prescriptive standards that populate law and morals tend to be 
vague, varying, and controversial. The descriptive standards of 
math and science can be expressed derivatively in terms of equalities 
and inequalities without much risk of confusion. Unfortunately, ex-
perience shows that the prescriptive standards of law and morals 
cannot be expressed derivatively in terms of equality and inequality 
without adding to the mysteries that already surround them. 
B. The Usefulness of the Confusion 
Professor Chemerinsky's last argument is in many ways the most 
interesting. Even if equality has no independent normative content 
of its own, it nonetheless has great symbolic value, he says, by virtue 
of its singular rhetorical force. The source of its value is its "emo-
tional power" to "persuade people to accept [results] that we believe 
[are] justified" and, thus, "to safeguard rights that otherwise would 
go unprotected."110 Regardless of whether equality is analytically 
empty, its "tremendous emotive force" makes it "rhetorically 
useful." 111 
I agree (and have said before) that equality possesses singular 
rhetorical force. 112 I also agree (and have also said before) that some 
empty and derivative concepts are rhetorically useful, particularly 
ones that work heuristically to focus attention on the considerations 
we have decided ought to govern the resolution of moral and legal 
issues. 113 I do not agree, however, that the rhetorical force of equal-
ity is useful, because I do not believe that its "emotive force" is be-
neficent. The rhetorical force of equality comes not from focusing 
our attention on the considerations that we believe should govern the 
108. See note 100 supra. 
109. See note 100 supra. 
110. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 6S-69. 
111. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 6S-66. 
112. See Westen, supra note 67, at S93 & nn.191-92. 
113. See id. at S79, n.147. 
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resolution of normative disputes, but by concealing, obscuring, and 
confounding them. 
The nature of the rhetoric of equality can be illustrated by the 
Equal Rights Amendment. The Equal Rights Amendment contains 
two elements - a substantive element, and a rhetorical element. 
Substantively, the Equal Rights Amendment prohibits the state from 
basing a person's legal entitlements on his sex, that is, from classify-
ing a person for legal purposes on the basis of sex. 114 Rhetorically, 
the Equal Rights Amendment expresses its substance in the language 
of "equality." Together the two elements combine as follows: 
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of sex." 
Significantly, while the framers and supporters of the Equal 
Rights Amendment chose to express themselves through the rhetoric 
of equality, their invocation of equality is both derivative and super-
fluous. The key rhetorical term in the amendment - the word 
"equality" - is entirely derivative: the relationship of identity ( or 
"equality") that would prevail among people by virtue of the amend-
ment follows logically from the standard of measure the amendment 
explicitly prescribes - that the state shall regulate people without 
regard to "sex." Moreover, because the amendment makes explicit 
the prescriptive standard by which the equality of persons is to be 
measured, the further reference to "equality" becomes entirely su-
perfluous.115 The word "equality" does not add anything to what 
the Amendment would mean without it: "[R]ights under the law 
I 14. Needless to say, like any moral or legal rule, the Equal Rights Amendment has to be 
interpreted and, in being interpreted, can be held to mean different things. Thus, it can be 
given what is ordinarily called its "literal" meaning and held to prohibit a state from basing 
any person's legal entitlements on his sex. Alternatively, it can be held to contain implicit 
exceptions, such as exceptions for segregated bathroom facilities, etc. The point is that in the 
absence of a determination that the Amendment contains implicit exceptions, and in the ab-
sence of an authoritative determination of what those exceptions consist of, the Equal Rights 
Amendment purports on its face to prohibit all explicit sexual discrimination by the state. See 
R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 43 (1980). 
I IS. If one wished to state the Equal Rights Amendment in nonredundant words, one 
could proceed in one of two ways. Following the example of the framers of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, one could simply prohibit the state from denying any person "equality of rights 
under the law," thus leaving unstated or implicit the normative standard by which equality is 
measured (i.e., that no person shall be denied rights solely because of his sex). Alternatively, 
following the example of the nineteenth amendment, one could make explicit the standard by 
which people are to be treated, by explicitly prohibiting the state from denying any person 
rights "on account of sex." It is simply redundant, however, to combine the first formulation 
with the second - as the Equal Rights Amendment does - because each formulation suffices 
entirely to prohibit discrimination based on sex. The Equal Rights Amendment is redundant 
in the same way in which the nineteenth amendment would be redundant if instead of prohib-
iting the state from denying citizens "the right ... to vote ... on account of sex" (as it does), 
it prohibited the state from denying citizens "equality of rights . . . to vote . . . on account of 
sex." 
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shall not be abridged or denied by the United States or by any State 
on account of sex." 
The reference to equality in the Equal Rights Amendment is re-
dundant. Yet it carries (and is preceived by ERA supporters as car-
rying) significant rhetorical force. 116 What precisely, then, is the 
source of its persuasive force? How, exactly, does the rhetoric of 
equality work its persuasion? Does it do so by revealing the content 
of the underlying prescriptive standard, or by obscuring it? The an-
swer, I believe, is plain: the rhetoric of equality in the Equal Rights 
Amendment invites agreement not by illuminating the controversial 
prescriptive standard on which it rests, but by concealing and con-
founding it. The substance of the Equal Rights Amendment is 
highly controversial. It prohibits the state from classifying persons 
on the basis of sex. Thus, if enforced literally, it would prohibit the 
state from deploying all-male combat forces; from maintaining all-
female residence halls or dormitory floors; from supporting all-fe-
male athletic teams; from providing all-male and all-female bath-
rooms; and from prohibiting all-male (or all-female) marriage. 117 
Yet the rhetoric of equality disarms potential opponents by obscur-
ing the Amendment's underlying standard and allowing them to in-
sert other standards - both descriptive and prescriptive - in its 
place. Thus, realizing that men and women are descriptively equal 
by some standard (e.g., by the standard of possessing X chromo-
somes), people may conclude that men and women must therefore 
116. The National ERA Outreach Campaign, in its "ERA Action Team Phone Bank Man• 
ual," urged "public opinion message worker[s] to emphasize the rhetoric of equality in their 
"sample messages" to persons. See ERA Action Team Phone Bank Manual, on file with the 
Michigan Law Review. The National Organization of Women urged ERA Countdown Cam-
paign workers to "[ajsk the press lo run the full text of the ERA." See JO Tips far Maximizing 
Your Coverage of the ERA Message Brigade," on file with the Michigan Law Review (emphasis 
in original). See also Letter from ERA Countdown Rallies Committee to Now Activists, of 
June 8, 1981, enclosing a sample pro-ERA editorial with the full text of the ERA, on file with 
the Michigan Law Review. The ERA Countdown Campaign in its paid advertisements empha• 
sized that the Equal Rights Amendment was about "equality." See Paid Political Advertise-
ment, The Sunday Oklahoman, Jan. 10, 1982, §A at 8-9 (urging people to read the actual text 
of the Equal Rights Amendment and concluding "we have waited long enough for equality"). 
See also The Sunday Oklahoman, Jan. 10, 1982 (Women's News) at 1: 
"The main reason we need the ERA is that over the Department of Justice (building) is 
the inscription, 'Equal Justice Under the Law,' and that makes the ERA in the tradition of 
this country,'' said Wanda Jo Peltier, head of the Oklahoma Women's Political Caucus. 
"We won't have equal justice until we get women in the Constitution." 
Interestingly, the word "equal" might carry a negative rhetorical content. See, e.g., Ann Arbor 
News, June 19, 1982, at A7 (quoting former Representative Martha Griffiths for the proposi-
tion that "the word 'equal' has been the downfall of the ERA"). 
117. See R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT 55, 64-66, 78-79 
(1980). Bui see Emerson & Lifton, Should the E.R.A. Be Rat[fted?, 55 CONN. B.J. 227, 233-34 
(1981) (arguing that the Equal Rights Amendment will be construed not to affect laws or 
regulations designed to protect privacy regarding intimate bodily behavior, or dealing with 
sexual preference). 
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be prescriptively equal for purposes of ERA; agreeing that men and 
women are prescriptively equal by some standards (e.g., by the pre-
scriptive standards governing suffrage), people may conclude that 
men and women must therefore be prescriptively equal for purposes 
of ERA; realizing that separate but equal athletic teams and rest-
room facilities are prescriptively equal by some standards (e.g., by 
the standard that the state spend the same amount of money on the 
care of women as on the care of men), people may conclude that 
ERA must therefore incorporate such standards. In each case, the 
rhetoric of equality persuades people to accept the substance of ERA 
- not by enlightening them, but by confounding them. 
Now it might be argued that the ends justify the means - that 
the substantive ends of equality rhetoric justify its beguiling means. 
Professor Chemerinsky seems to suggest as much in arguing that 
equality "helps us to persuade people to accept [results] that we be-
lieve [are] justified." I would be tempted to agree with him if I 
shared his confidence that certain "result[s]" are constitutionally 
'justified," and that equality will be invoked exclusively on their be-
half. Unfortunately, besides lacking Professor Chemerinsky's confi-
dence about what values are ultimately justified, I have no reason to 
believe that the rhetoric of equality will advance those values and no 
others. Every legal rule treats all people equally in some respects and 
unequally in other respects. Every rule, therefore, can be expressed 
and defended on the grounds that it treats equals equally. Equality 
was invoked in the past to justify slavery. 118 It has been invoked in 
our times to justify segregating the education of blacks and whites, 119 
to deny pregnancy benefits to women, 120 and to presumptively dis-
qualify women from jury service.121 Even if ends justify means, and 
even if one knows which ends are justified, one may as often find 
oneself arguing against equality as arguing on its behalf. 122 
I 18. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1252a at 5-30, 1255b at 15 (T. Sinclair trans. 1962). 
See generally D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 66-72 (1966); 
Campbell, Aristotle and Black Slavery: A Study in Race Prejudice, IS Race 3 (1974). 
I 19. See Brief for Appellees at 17-30, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), re-
printed in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975). 
120. See Guduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 424 (1974). 
121. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), overruled, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 
(1975). 
122. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (Opinion of 
Powell, J.) (criticizing programs of affirmative action for admission to medical school as "not 
equaf') (emphasis added), with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 363,368,373 (opinion of Brennan, White, 
Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.) (praising such programs in the name of"equal opportunity") (em-
phasis added). Cf. People ex rel S.P.B., - Colo.-, 651 P.2d 1213 (Oct. 12, 1982) (consider-
ing the argument that by imposing child-support duties on both parents without according the 
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Alternatively, equality might be defended precisely on the 
ground that it is a rhetorical device by which courts can accommo-
date ebbs and flows in values without giving the appearance of 
fickleness. No written constitution, no matter how farsighted, can at 
a single point in time embody all the fundamental moral conceptions 
that a society may come to embrace in the course of its history.123 
Every society, therefore, needs some general concepts - like the 
concept of due process - by which courts can adopt newly arising 
values and slough off old values without giving the appearance of 
constitutional fluctuation. The concept of equality performs that 
function by serving as a rhetorical rubric under which courts can 
subsume the prevailing prescriptive rules of the day. 
The foregoing argument has some force, because societies do 
benefit from possessing shared concepts not tied to particular passing 
conceptions.124 The trouble with equality, however, is that it does 
more than accommodate shifting values. It obscures them. That is 
the essential difference between equality, on the one hand, and due 
process, on the other. Like the concept of treating equals "equaij.y," 
the concept of giving everyone his "due" can encompass an unlim-
ited range of particular normative conceptions. It is a form of argu-
ment, a variable, which can assume the coloration of whatever 
happen to be the prevailing conceptions of the day - whether they 
be the right of slaveholders to travel with slaves through federal ter-
ritories, 125 or the right of businessmen to set the terms and hours of 
employment, 126 or the right of pregnant women to make autono-
mous decisions regarding abortion. I27 The difference between 
equality and due process is that equality conceals its conclusory na-
ture, while due process reveals it. Substantive due process does not 
purport to be anything other than what it is - a conclusory rubric to 
be invoked as a label for whatever values are deemed fundamental 
at the moment. Equality, in contrast, performs the same function, 
father a right to decide that a fetus be aborted, the Uniform Parentage Act denies fathers equal 
protection of the laws); Sullivan, Some Thoughts on the Constitutionality of Good Samaritan 
Statutes, 8 AM. J. LAW & MEDICINE 27 (1982) (arguing that good Samaritan statutes may 
violate the principle of equal protection of the laws); q: Willhelm, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. 
REv. 847,852 (1981) (''The very idea of Equality, of treating Blacks and Whites alike, is racist 
because it fails to take account of over three hundred years of racist oppression. . • • Thus, the 
myth of Equality serves as a racist doctrine to justify the continued economic subjugation of 
Blacks, who remain powerless to define Equality to meet Black needs or to force abandonment 
of the myth altogether in favor of racial justice.") (footnotes omitted). 
123. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87-101 (1980). 
124. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-37 (1977). 
125. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
126. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
127. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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but with considerably less candor. It, too, serves as a rubric for 
whatever happens to be perceived as fundamental values of the day; 
yet it does so while purporting to be "an independent norm"128 in its 
own right. 
Mystification may have a rightful place in the rhetoric of politics. , 
But it can become an instrument of abuse in the hands of officials 
who supposedly derive their authority from the informed consent of 
the people, and in the hands of judges who supposedly derive their 
legitimacy from a commitment to reasoned explanation. 129 
CONCLUSION 
"Maybe you are right about equality," it will be said. "Maybe 
equality is empty and confusing, and maybe it should be banished 
from moral discourse as an explanatory norm. But it cannot be ban-
ished from legal discourse - at least not in this country - because it 
figures explicitly in our fundamental law. The fourteenth amend-
ment codifies the idea of equality and thereby gives it an unavoida-
ble role in legal discourse." 
The foregoing argument is premised on fallacies about what it 
means to say equality is "empty," and what it means to banish 
equality "as an explanatory norm." Empty does not mean "mean-
ingless," and banishing an idea as an explanatory norm does not 
mean banishing the values that underlie it. 
Equality is empty in the same way that substantive due process is 
empty. Both are derivative formulas possessing no independent nor-
mative content apart from the anterior rights and rules they incorpo-
rate by reference. The formula of substantive justice, "to each his 
due,"130 is derivative in nature. It commands us to give a person his 
due, but it does not itself define a person's due. It simply incorpo-
rates by reference whatever rights or rules for a person are otherwise 
deemed to exist - whether the right to contract, the right to marry, 
128. Chemerinsky, supra note 43, text accompanying notes 79-82; id at n. 42. 
129. See Fiss, Tlte Supreme Court, 1978 Tenn, Foreword: Tlte Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 13 (1979): 
The judge is entitled to exercise power only after he has participated in a dialogue about 
the meaning of the public values. It is a dialogue with very special qualities: ... (c) 
Judges are compelleo to speak back, to respond to the grievance or the claim, and to 
assume individual responsibility for that response. (d) Judges must also justify their 
decisions. 
See also Wellington, Tlte Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486,509 (1982) ("Courts-
at least appellate courts - generally believe themselves under an obligation to justify what 
they hold."). 
130. See H. KELSEN,Aristotle's .Doctrine of Justice, in WHAT Is JUSTICE? 128 (1971) ("Ar-
istotle's definition of distributive justice is but a mathematical formulation of the well-known 
principle suum cuiffue, to each his own, or to each his due."). 
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or the right to rear one's children.131 No particular statement of sub-
stantive due process - such as the right to marry - is ever meaning-
less. Statements of substantive due process possess precisely as much 
meaning (and as little meaning) as the underlying rights that sub-
stantiate them. They possess no additional meaning, however, be-
cause substantive due process itself has no meaning apart from the 
rights and rules it incorporates by reference. Substantive due pro-
cess itself is empty. 
The same holds true of equality. Particular statements of equal-
ity are never meaningless. They possess as much meaning as the 
underlying rights and rules they incorporate by reference - whether 
the right to travel, the right to appeal a criminal conviction without 
regard to one's wealth, or the right to have one's vote in state elec-
tions weighted in accord with one's share of the population of the 
state as a whole.132 Statements of equality have no additional mean-
ing, however, above and beyond the standards they incorporate by 
reference, because equality itself has no content apart from those 
standards. Statements of equality have meaning, but the meaning is 
entirely derivative. Equality itself, like substantive due process, is 
empty.133 
131. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (right to contract); Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535 (1925) (right 
to rear one's children). 
132. See Zobel v. Williams, 102 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("As is 
clear from our cases, the right to travel achieves its most forceful expression in the context of 
equal protection analysis."); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right of a criminal 
defendant to appeal a criminal conviction without regard to wealth); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533 (1964) (right to have one's vote in the state elections weighted in accord with one's 
share of the population of the state as a whole). 
133. To state the same thing in other words, equality possesses the quality of amoral varia-
ble, incorporating by reference whatever specific moral standards one wishes to insert, See 
Westen, On "Confusing Ideas'!· Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1153, 1156-58 (1982). This capacity of 
equality to function as a moral variable is easily illustrated. Following the Declaration of 
Independence, a number of American states - including Massachusetts and Virginia - en-
acted bills of rights, declaring their peoples "free and equal." See MASS, CONST. pt. I, art. I 
(1780, amended 1976) ("all men are born free and equal"); VA. CONST. OF 1776 art. I,§ 1 ("all 
men are by nature equally free and independent"). See generally W. ADAMS, THE FIRST 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 164-88 (1980). Despite their common invocation of the term 
"equal," the two states meant to constitutionalize very different moral standards and, hence, 
very different measures of "equality." Thus, by declaring all men "equal," Massachusetts 
meant to abolish slavery. It meant to constitutionalize the rule - "no person shall be held in a 
condition of slavery." See "The Quock Walker Case," in 1 H. COMMAOER, DOCUMENTS OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY 110 (9th ed. 1973) (report of an opinion by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court declaring slavery unconstitutional in Massachusetts under the "free and equal" 
clause of the Massachusetts Constitution). In contrast, by declaring all men "equally free," 
Virginia meant to do nothing that would interfere with the institution of hereditary slavery, It 
meant to constitutionalize the rule - "no person shall be denied the freedom to which he is 
rightfully entitled by birth." See Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806), For 
further discussion as to what was (and what was not) decided in (luock Walker, and as to the 
contrast between Massachusetts and Virginia, see R. COVER, JusTICE AccusED 43-55 (1975), 
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Equality can be banished as an explanatory norm in the same 
way that substantive due process can be banished as an explanatory 
norm: both can be pierced and discarded as superfluous veils for 
underlying rights and rules. The due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment is deemed to be the locus of the right of a woman 
to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.134 One can talk about the en-
titlement in two ways. One can talk about it indirectly, by referring 
to the right of substantive "due process"; or one can pierce the lan-
guage of due process and talk directly about the "right to an abor-
tion." The language of due process does not add anything of 
substance to a direct reference to the rights that underlie it. "Due 
process" is a rhetorical device - a formal way of talking about enti-
tlements by reference. Due process does not "explain" the right of 
abortion, and in the context of abortion, it does not exist as an in-
dependent norm. We can preserve the right of abortion in its full-
ness and yet banish due process as an explanatory norm. 
The same holds true for equality. The equal protection clause is 
deemed to be the locus of a variety of entitlements, including the 
right of a person not to be stigmatized on the basis of race. 135 One 
can talk about the latter entitlement in various ways. One can talk 
about it indirectly, by referring to "equal protection"; or one can 
pierce the language of equal protection and talk directly about the 
underlying right to be free from stigmatic classification. The lan-
guage of equality adds nothing of substance to the right that under-
lies it. "Equal protection" is a rhetorical device - a formal way of 
talking about entitlements by reference to the identities they entail. 
Equal protection does not explain the right to be free from stigmatic 
classification, and in the context of stigmatic classification, it does 
not exist as an independent norm. We can preserve the right to be 
free from racial stigma and yet banish equality as an explanatory 
norm. We not only can. We should. 
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See generally Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo!fi 
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973). 
135. See Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2393 (1982) ("The Equal Protection Clause was 
intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste- and invidious class-based 
legislation."). 
